FALSE COMFORT AND IMPOSSIBLE PROMISES: UNCERTAINTY,
INFORMATION OVERLOAD, AND THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE
*

Cynthia R. Farina

[The time will assuredly come] when every vital interest of the state will be
merged in the all-absorbing question of who shall be the next President?
—Alexander Hamilton

1

Reasonable people might reasonably fear that contemporary
American government has gotten out of control. Even those who do
not believe in a minimalist, night-watchman state justifiably worry that
much U.S. policy making and implementation is now beyond the
ability of even most politically engaged citizens to comprehend, let
alone to assess on the merits and attribute to the appropriate institutional actors. In such a society, is it any longer possible to retain even
an ideal conception of our collective civic identity as a government
2
“of the people, by the people, [and] for the people”?
To this fundamentally important question, the unitary executive
3
conception of the presidency emphatically answers “yes.” Its argument is essentially this: the people can maintain control over the direction and performance of the national regulatory state through

*

1

2
3

Professor, Cornell Law School; Director, Cornell e-Rulemaking Initiative. I am indebted
to participants in faculty workshops at Wake Forest Law School and University of Florida
Levin College of Law, for helping me clarify my thinking about the ideas in this paper.
Quoted in 3 JOHN C. HAMILTON, HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AS TRACED IN THE WRITINGS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND OF HIS
COTEMPORARIES 346–47 (1859) (emphasis omitted).
President Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).
Scholarship in the unitary executive tradition is cited throughout this Essay, but the principal works are: Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48
ARK. L. REV. 23, 67 (1995); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s
Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes
The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153
(1992); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231,
1241–46 (1994). Memoranda from the George W. Bush Administration Office of Legal
Counsel contain some of the most emphatic recent statements of unitary executive theory. See infra notes 6 and 88.
Two other important articles advocate the unitary executive approach without accepting that it is required as a matter of originalist constitutional interpretation: Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R.
Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994).
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their ultimate representative, the President. Article II vests him with
the full federal executive authority. All officials charged with implementing federal statutes are therefore his agents. Authorized to “take
5
Care” that all federal laws “be faithfully executed,” he has the duty—
and hence the power—to direct and, if necessary, correct the deci6
sions of those agents. Unlike either the multi-member legislature or
the collegial judiciary, his office is deliberately structured to focus responsibility and to foster resolute, purposeful and efficient action.
Moreover, as the only official whose electoral constituency is nationwide, only he represents all Americans. When he coordinates policy,
establishes administrative priorities, and sets the goals and limits of
regulatory solutions, he answers to the whole people rather than to
the narrow factional interests of particular regions. When he acts to
secure our interests at home and abroad he, uniquely, reflects and
embodies the mandate of the nation.
This is a bold solution to the riddle of how a twenty-first century
global superpower can be governed both democratically and effectively. When, in addition, scholars such as Steven Calabresi and
Christopher Yoo not only trace unitary executive theory back to the
original constitutional understanding but also discern two hundred
7
years of conforming executive practice, they undergird the theory’s
4
5
6

7

“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
“Power follows responsibility” reasoning is a staple technique of unitary executive interpretation. See, e.g., Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Legal Counsel
to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. 4, 6 (Mar. 14, 2003), available at
http://gulcfac.typepad.com/georgetown_university_law/files/march.14.memo.part1.pdf
(arguing that “the Founders entrusted the President with the primary responsibility, and
therefore the power, to protect the security of the United States,” and that the President
has “complete discretion in exercising the Commander-in-Chief power”). I argue elsewhere that the converse reasoning–“responsibility follows power”—is a far more important constitutional principle. See Cynthia R. Farina, Presidential Virtue: An Essay on
Constitutional Culture and Constitutional Conscience (Jan. 2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
A subset of unitary executive scholarship hesitates to recognize presidential power to
direct specific regulatory outcomes, although it insists that the President can fire decisionmakers who do not make the decision the President prefers. See, e.g., Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive Theory from Those Who Would Distort and Abuse It: A
Review of The Unitary Executive by Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo, 12 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 593, 597–98 (2010).
STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008). Earlier historical accounts included Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3; Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 3; Lawson, supra note 3;
Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701.
Challenges to the originalist case include: David M. Driesen, Toward a Duty-Based
Theory of Executive Power, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 71 (2009); Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of
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audacity with authenticity. In this Essay, I am less interested in debating the historical pedigree of unitary executive theory than in considering its remarkable ascendency over the last thirty years. No longer
8
just the credo of the Federalist Society and Reagan Republicans, it
has attained mainstream constitutional status and won adherents
9
across the political spectrum.
Those outside the legal academy might respond that the greater
wonder than the striking success of unitary executive theory is that it
has taken law so long to catch up with larger cultural phenomena.
Over the last hundred years, Presidents of both parties have been exploiting the growing pervasiveness and immediacy of mass media
communications to establish a highly personal representative relationship with citizens. In the process, the presidency has been redefined as the core of American government. Speaking directly to the
people, and enlisting their support in what thereby becomes the uniquely presidential enterprise of leading the country to safety and
prosperity, modern Presidents have emerged as “the single head of
the government and moral leader of the nation who speaks for and
10
may be taken as equivalent to all the people.” In this “personal” (or
11
“plebiscitary”) presidency, Congress and federal agencies recede to

8

9

10

11

the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 1007–18
(1997); A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency’s New Vestments, 88 NW. U. L. REV.
1346 (1994); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61
U. CHI. L. REV. 123 (1994); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 3; Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits
of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259 (2009); Garrett Epps, The Ill-Made Prince: A
Modest Proposal for a New Article II (Aug. 7, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1445643.
See Amanda Hollis-Brusky, The Federalist Society and the Unitary Executive: An Epistemic Community at Work, (Paper Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Am. Political Sci. Ass’n,
Sept. 3, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1456598.
E.g., Kagan, supra note 3; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 3. Accounts of the unitary executive propensities of recent administrations include Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945–2004, 90 IOWA L.
REV. 601 (2005) and Christopher S. Kelley, The Unitary Executive and the Clinton Administration (Jan. 17, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1329485.
BARBARA HINCKLEY, THE SYMBOLIC PRESIDENCY: HOW PRESIDENTS PORTRAY THEMSELVES
134 (1990) (analyzing presidential speeches from Truman to Reagan); see also MARY E.
STUCKEY, THE PRESIDENT AS INTERPRETER-IN-CHIEF (1991) (studying presidential rhetoric
and reaching similar conclusions). Presidential scholar Lyn Ragsdale notes that the effort
to emphasize the uniqueness of each President has itself become an institutional feature
of the modern presidency. See LYN RAGSDALE, VITAL STATISTICS ON THE PRESIDENCY:
GEORGE WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH 170–71 (2009).
See, e.g., SAMUEL KERNELL, GOING PUBLIC: NEW STRATEGIES OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP
(2d ed. 1993); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED, PROMISE
UNFULFILLED xi (1985); CRAIG A. RIMMERMAN, PRESIDENCY BY PLEBISCITE: THE REAGAN-
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supporting roles in the enterprise of democratic governance: at best,
they are sidekicks doing the actual work of implementing the President’s policy agenda. At worst, they are rogues and obstructionists to
achieving the people’s interests that the President will overcome with
the people’s help. Unitary executive theory (finally) provides the
constitutional backstory for this ongoing political drama.
Still, recognizing unitary executive theory as the inevitable, if belated, legal apologia for the modern American presidency reframes
the question, rather than resolving it: what is the attraction of personal, President-centered government as now justified by unitary executive theory? The President, in the cultural and the legal account,
is an exceptionally faithful and beneficent representative of the people. Yet neither the contemporary process of presidential selection
nor the observed behavior of voters, candidates, or Presidents corroborates the story of a “Representative-in-Chief,” whose immunity
from regionalism and special interest politics enables him, uniquely,
to identify and further some higher will of the whole nation. Moreover, the managerial claim that Presidents do—or could, if only our
legal regime would acknowledge their full constitutional authority—
bring coherence, rationality, and accountability to the vast U.S. regulatory enterprise is unrealistic, if not completely implausible. Lawyers
should also recognize that this “Decider-in-Chief” story threatens the
values of expertise and legality that have been foundations of the
12
modern administrative state. Given all these improbabilities and
contradictions, why is unitary executive theory, along with the larger
socio-political phenomenon of President-centered government it legitimizes, so appealing to the popular and scholarly imagination?
Part I draws on cognitive, social, and political psychology to suggest that the extreme cognitive and psychological demands made on
citizens by modern life create particular susceptibility to a political
and constitutional ideology organized around a potent and beneficent leader, who champions the people’s interests in the face of internal obstacles and external dangers. Part II, which considers the
exaggerated representational and managerial claims made by this
ideology, draws on the large body of relevant work in election studies,
public administration, and political science to argue that very conditions which make the personal, unitary executive presidency so appealing also, ironically, ensure that no President can be the leader it
BUSH ERA IN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 24–25 (1993); JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE
RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY (1987).
12

See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007).
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promises. Finally, the conclusion considers the post-2008 revisionism
that is now interpreting the George W. Bush Presidency as a perversion of unitary executive theory. It warns against the reassuring con13
clusion that a peculiar conjunction of inept but ruthless leadership
14
and professional irresponsibility of epic proportions produced the
excesses of that Administration. Accurate as those assessments may
be, the vital lesson for the future is that the capacity for extremism is
inescapably part of the unitary executive presidency.
I. FALSE COMFORT
[People] are guided by two chief motivations, the desire to make a good
decision, and the desire to make an easy decision.
—Lau, Andersen, and Redlawsk, An Exploration of Correct Voting in Recent U.S.
15
Presidential Elections

Modern American citizenship is hard on the human psyche. The
volume and breadth of social and economic policymaking undertaken by the federal government on our behalf is breathtaking. A recent empirical study estimates that regulatory agencies annually issue
600–800 notices asking for public comment on proposed rules, plus
16
about 200 final rules that become effective without public comment.
These agency actions run the gamut from the monumental to the
(relatively) trivial; they may implicate deeply contested value judgments or involve resolution of mind-numbingly technical questions.
In 2008 alone, the nearly 200 federal entities with rulemaking authority finalized regulations on issues ranging from permissible levels of
17
18
airborne lead to handling onions grown in South Texas. They es-
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15
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17
18

E.g., Peter Bergen, How Bush Botched War on Terror, CNN.COM, Jan. 8, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/01/07/bergen.war.terror/index.html.
E.g., Peter M. Shane, Three Takes on the OLC Torture Memos, EXECUTIVE WATCH, Apr. 21,
2009, http://executivewatch.net/2009/04/21/three-takes-on-the-olc-torture-memos/.
Richard R. Lau, David J. Andersen & David P. Redlawsk, An Exploration of Correct Voting in
Recent U.S. Presidential Elections, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 395, 397 (2008).
Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern
Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 931 (2008); see also Jason Webb Yackee & Susan
Webb Yackee, Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic Performance: Is Federal Rulemaking
“Ossified”? 12, 32 (Univ. Wis. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 1079, 2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1371588 (estimating
average of 720 notice-and-comment rulemakings per year based on Unified Agenda).
National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Lead, 73 Fed. Reg. 66,964 (Nov. 12, 2008)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. § 50.12).
Onions Grown in South Texas, 73 Fed. Reg. 10,973 (Feb. 29, 2008) (codified at 7 C.F.R.
§ 959).
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tablished compensation levels for “bumping” airline passengers, set
20
maximum hours of driving for commercial truckers, defined infla21
tion adjustments for immigration law violation penalties, and specified minimum square footage of indoor and outdoor space for home
22
child-care providers serving Head Start children.
The scale of federal policymaking is often incomprehensible to
citizens. A single policy initiative, the bailout of financial institutions,
is estimated to cost two trillion dollars over its lifetime—a figure with
no reality to most of us until it is rescaled to “ordinary” dimensions
(e.g., the cost of giving $5,500 to every U.S. resident), at which point
23
it becomes frightening. The geographical scope of U.S. interest and
influence is literally global. Countries about which the average person knows little, if anything, suddenly emerge as objects of need that
claim our financial and human resources, centers of conflict that require our soldiers, and sources of threat that imperil our societal and
personal well-being.
The Parts that follow examine how socio-political conditions of
late twentieth and early twenty-first century America create an environment in which citizens are especially susceptible to the simplifying, palliating claims of the modern “personal” presidency and unitary executive theory.

19
20
21

22
23

Oversales and Denied Boarding Compensation, 73 Fed. Reg. 21,026 (Apr. 18, 2008) (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 250.8).
Hours of Service of Drivers, 73 Fed. Reg. 69,567 (Nov. 19, 2008) (codified at 49 C.F.R.
§ 395).
Inflation Adjustment for Civil Monetary Penalties Under Sections 274A, 274B, and 274C
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 10,130 (Feb. 26, 2008) (codified at
28 C.F.R. § 280.53).
Head Start Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 1285 (Jan. 8, 2008) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 1304,
1306).
Oddly, “$2 trillion” featured frequently in discussions of events in the last quarter of 2008.
In addition to being a conservative estimate of Federal Reserve Bank loans to troubled financial institutions, Mark Pittman et al., Fed Defies Transparency Aim in Refusal to Disclose,,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 10, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601087&sid=aatlky_cH.tY&refer=worldwide, it emerged as Nobel-prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz’s estimate of the total cost of the Iraq war, Tom Regan, Report: Iraq
War Costs Could Top $2 Trillion, CSMONITOR.COM, Jan. 10, 2006, available at
http://www.pierretristam.com/Bobst/07/wf032807.htm, and the loss of Americans’ retirement savings from the stock market’s prolonged slide, Nancy Trejos, Retiremet Savings
Lose $2 Trillion in 15 Months, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2008, at A1.
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A. Future Shock and Cognitive Compensation
The world of today . . . is as different from the world in which I was born as
that world was from Julius Caesar’s. I was born in the middle of human
history, to date, roughly. Almost as much has happened since I was born as
happened before.
—Kenneth E. Boulding (1910–1993)

24

Attention is a finite and non-renewable resource.
Whenever we search for and choose intentional investments, the acts of
searching and choosing themselves require attentional investments.
—Thorngate’s First & Fifth Principles of the economics of attention

25

In 1970, sociologist Alvin Toffler speculated that people in modern industrial societies live under conditions of such intense exposure to new information and accelerated rate of cultural change that
26
they become vulnerable to a state of “future shock.” Rapid evolution of scientific knowledge, coupled with cumulating advances in
communication, transportation, and other technologies, he argued,
produce a state of sensory overstimulation, “information overload,”
and “decision stress”:
[T]he increased rate at which situations flow past us vastly complicates
the entire structure of life, multiplying the number of roles we must play
and the number of choices we are forced to make . . . .
Moreover, the speeded-up flow-through of situations demands much
more work from the complex focusing mechanisms by which we shift our
attention from one situation to another. There is more switching back
and forth, less time for extended, peaceful attention to one problem or
situation at a time . . . .
There is, however, still another, even more powerfully significant way
in which the acceleration of change in society increases the difficulty of
coping with life. This stems from the fantastic intrusion of novelty, newness into our existence . . . .
The acceleration of change . . . radically alters the balance between
novel and familiar situations. Rising rates of change thus compel us not
merely to cope with a faster flow, but with more and more situations to
which previous personal experience does not apply. And the psychologi27
cal implications of this simple fact . . . are nothing short of explosive.

24
25
26
27

ALVIN TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 15 (1970) (quoting Kenneth E. Boulding, The Prospects
of Economic Abundance, Nobel Conference Lecture (1966)).
Warren Thorngate, On Paying Attention, in RECENT TRENDS IN THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY
247 (W. Baker, L. Mos, H. Rappard & H. Stam eds., 1988).
TOFFLER, supra note 24.
Id. at 33.
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These psychological implications, Toffler posited, include the
feeling of being overwhelmed with the complexity of modern life; a
perception of individual and collective loss of control; increased tension, self-doubt, and anxiousness; and “a deepening sense of confu28
sion and uncertainty.” He hypothesized that people try to avoid
these disturbing mental states through a number of strategies: attempting to return to past modes of thought and action, individually
or through a collective “politics of nostalgia” (reversion);
“search[ing] for a unitary solution” or explanation (supersimplification); and “flatly refus[ing] to take in new information” that
further complicates decisions or calls into question existing beliefs
29
(denial).
In the forty years since Future Shock was published, research has
significantly advanced our understanding of human thinking and behavior. Yet, the picture contemporary psychologists paint of cognition, motivation, and social interaction aligns surprisingly well with
Toffler’s predictions.
Cognitive psychology models the human brain as an information
processor with a remarkable ability to conserve its own resources.
Studies of attention and judgment reveal the brain making use of
numerous strategies to stretch finite cognitive capacity; these strategies allow rapid, almost reflexive, determination of which pieces of
information ought be attended to, how the pieces fit together, and
30
what they signify. Chief among the strategies are heuristics (simple,
31
“fast and frugal” rules of thumb for making judgments ), schemata
(mental models or scripts that organize our experience into generic
32
patterns we use to interpret, and bridge gaps in, new information ),
and prototypes (items which, by representing the “most typical” char-

28
29
30
31

32

Id. at 322.
Id. at 319–21.
See, e.g., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman,
Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART (1999). “By ‘heuristics,’ we mean problem-solving strategies (often employed automatically or unconsciously), which serve to ‘keep the information processing demands of the task within
bounds.’” Richard R. Lau & David P. Redlawsk, Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive
Heuristics in Political Decision Making, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 951, 952 (2001) (citation omitted).
“For example, one’s schema about university professors might include the information
that they are bookish, methodical, verbose, and badly-dressed.” Patricia Pliner, Cognitive
Schemas: How Can We Use Them to Improve Children’s Acceptance of Diverse and Unfamiliar
Foods?, 99 BRITISH J. NUTRITION S2, S2 (Supp. I 2008). The relationship between schemata
and stereotyping is obvious.
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acteristics that distinguish what is in a given category from what is
not, provide a benchmark for categorizing new information).
Social and political psychologists discern these same mental strategies operating when individuals make choices about social behavior,
33
group affiliation, and formation of political judgments. For example, prototyping and the use of schema helps us differentiate and eva34
luate social groups and political candidates. Extensive reliance on
heuristics is thought by some political scientists to explain how relatively coherent mass public opinion can emerge from a nation of individuals who have little knowledge and less sophistication about po35
litical candidates and issues.
The human brain, in other words, works hard to manage incom36
ing stimuli in a way that avoids “information overload.” Attention is
37
a limited resource, and if the brain is forced to process more information than available cognitive capacity can manage, the individual
experiences anxiety, fatigue, a sense of being overwhelmed, frustration, anger, increasingly poor decision making, depression, with38
drawal, feelings of panic, and, ultimately, complete inability to act.
Factors that contribute to the “cognitive load” of incoming information include quantity, interrelatedness, complexity, novelty, ambigu-

33

34

35

36

37

38

See, e.g., RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE:
STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980); POLITICIAL COGNITION: THE 19TH ANNUAL
CARNEGIE SYMPOSIUM ON COGNITION (Richard R. Lau & David O. Sears eds., 1986).
Michael A. Hogg, Uncertainty, Social Identity, and Ideology, 22 ADVANCES GROUP PROCESSES
203, 207 (2005). “If the salient characteristics of a particular politician are consistent with
or representative of the prototypic Republican, say, then voters may readily infer that she
is for a strong defense, low taxes, against government intervention in the economy,
against abortion, and so on . . . .” Lau & Redlawsk, supra note 31, at 953.
For collection of the literature, see James N. Druckman, Does Political Information Matter?,
22 POL. COMM. 515 (2005); Lau & Redlawsk, supra note 31. This thesis is controverted.
Lau and Redlawsk found that almost all voters use common political heuristics at times,
and that such use is especially likely in situations of complex choice. However, use of
heuristics by politically unsophisticated voters actually reduces the likelihood that they will
choose the candidate most closely reflecting their views. Id.; see infra text accompanying
notes 99–113. For discussion of why this is so, see Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Idea, 12 CRITICAL REV. 413 (1998) (vigorously disputing the theory that heuristics
enable meaningful democratic judgment by an uninformed citizenry).
Also called “cognitive overload,” “knowledge overload,” and “sensory overload.” See Martin J. Eppler & Jeanne Mengis, The Concept of Information Overload: A Review of Literature
from Organization Science, Accounting, Marketing, MIS, and Related Disciplines, 20 INFO. SOC’Y
325, 326 (2004).
E.g., Carol A. Heimer, Thinking About How To Avoid Thought: Deep Norms, Shallow Rules,
and the Structure of Attention, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 30, 30 (2008). See also Thorngate, supra note 25 (identifying six principles of “the economics of attention”).
E.g., Kenneth Einar Himma, The Concept of Information Overload: A Preliminary Step in Understanding the Nature of a Harmful Information-Related Condition, 9 ETHICS & INFO. TECH.
259, 267 (2007).
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39

ity, simultaneity, and intensity. As these factors cumulate, the uncomfortable sensations associated with approaching the limits of
cognitive and attentive capacities increase; this, in turn, increases the
value of cognitive strategies that reduce attentional and cognitive
processing demands. Consciously or not, individuals under conditions of information overload gravitate toward ways of thinking that
simplify issues, narrow the range of acceptable choices, and delegate
decisional responsibility to someone perceived to have power or
40
competence.
At the collective level, this phenomenon can increase the attractiveness of certain types of groups and belief systems. When people
perceive that they cannot know, or understand, all the information
necessary to be confident of making the right decision about something that matters to them, the result is a psychologically uncomfort41
able state of uncertainty.
Social psychologist Michael Hogg explains:
People strive to reduce feelings of uncertainty, particularly uncertainty
about and related to themselves, and about their social world and their
place within it . . . . Some uncertainty is exciting, making us feel edgy and
alive, but for most of us most of the time acute uncertainty, enduring uncertainty, and uncertainty about and related to self in social context is
42
aversive.

People can reduce such uncertainty by affiliating with a group
that defines the individual’s role and relationship to others, or by adhering to a belief system (an “ideology”) that offers an integrated set
of beliefs and values explaining the world and specifying appropriate
43
individual and social action. Certain types of groups and belief sys39

40

41

42
43

For an excellent synthesis of the literature, see Eppler & Mengis, supra note 36, at 330–33.
See also John Sweller & Paul Chandler, Why Some Material Is Difficult to Learn, 12
COGNITION & INSTRUCTION 185 (1994) (discussing problem in context of learning theory
and instructional design).
See, e.g., Eppler & Mengis, supra note 36; Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard
Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1226–29 (2003) (collecting
literature on simplification and reduction of options); cf. Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R.
Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627 (1999) (examining citizen use
of unions, political parties, and corporations as political intermediaries to oversee and
monitor government action).
See Janet A. Sniezek & Timothy Buckley, Becoming More or Less Uncertain, in INDIVIDUAL
AND GROUP DECISIONMAKING: CURRENT ISSUES 87, 88 (N. John Castellan, Jr. ed., 1993)
(“subjective uncertainty” is the individual’s perception of inaccessibility of information, in
contrast to “environmental uncertainty” which is the objective reality that information is
unavailable).
Hogg, supra note 34, at 209.
Group affiliation “renders one’s own and others’ behavior predictable and thus allows
one to avoid harm and plan effective action. It also allows one to know how one should
feel and behave.” Id. at 210. For an overview of studies demonstrating that uncertainty
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tems are more capable of serving this function than others. The
greatest degree of uncertainty reduction is afforded by groups and
ideologies that (i) define themselves through unambiguous, uncompromising boundaries; (ii) adopt a highly focused, internally consistent set of beliefs and values; (iii) reject subtlety and contradiction in
favor of a single, uncomplicated version of “the truth;” (iv) prize loyalty and conformity over individual critical judgment and initiative;
and (v) offer a clear hierarchical structure, in which power is vested
in a leader strongly associated with the group’s identity and trusted to
44
determine its destiny. Appeals to authority and shared tradition of45
ten play an important part.

44

45

arising from social context makes people more likely to identify (or to identify strongly)
with groups, see Michael A. Hogg, Subjective Uncertainty Reduction Through SelfCategorization: A Motivational Theory of Social Identity Processes, 11 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL.
223 (2000).
Michael A. Hogg et al., Uncertainty, Entitativity, and Group Identification, 43 J.
EXPERIMENTAL. SOC. PSYCHOL. 135 (2007); see also Hogg, supra note 34, at 211–13 (citing
additional sources).
On the importance of the group leader in times of uncertainty and crisis, see Daan
van Knippenberg & Michael A. Hogg, A Social Identity Model of Leadership Effectiveness in Organizations, 25 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 243, 245–46 (2003). Michael Hogg and
Daan van Knippenberg review studies suggesting that under conditions of strong group
identification, members will attribute status, support, capability, and persuasiveness to the
most prototypical member of the group. Social Identity and Leadership Processes in Groups,
35 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Hogg & van Knippenberg, Social Identity]. “Attribution processes, specifically the fundamental attribution error, correspondence bias, or essentialism, operate to construct a charismatic and leadership persona for the prototypical leader.” Id. at 41; see also Michael A. Hogg, From
Prototypicality to Power: A Social Identity Analysis of Leadership, 18 ADVANCES GROUP
PROCESSES 1, 1 (2001) [hereinafter Hogg, Prototypicality] (analyzing how “prototypical
group members can become leaders”). In other words, leaders whose attitudes, behaviors, etc. are seen as epitomizing the characteristics that separate “us” (in group) from
“them” (out group) are perceived to be effective and so “acquire[] greater and more secure leadership ability.” Hogg & van Knippenberg, Social Identity, supra note 44, at 41.
For a broader discussion of these issues in the context of political leadership, see
BARBARA KELLERMAN, BAD LEADERSHIP: WHAT IT IS, HOW IT HAPPENS, WHY IT MATTERS
22 (2004).
See Hogg, supra note 34, at 215–19 (discussing work on orthodoxy and authoritarianism).
See also Michael A. Hogg, Uncertainty-Identity Theory, 39 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 69, 93–94 (2007) (describing work of “postmodern paradox” theorists, who argue that the contemporary “atomistic, individual-oriented status societ[ies]” which have
replaced stable matrices of rank, familial, and social relationship give rise to a paradox in
which “people with today’s less structured self yearn for community and the collective affiliations of times past”).
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B. Present Shock and Palliative Politics
A weekday edition of The New York Times contains more information than
the average person [in the seventeenth century] was likely to come across in
a lifetime during seventeenth-century England.
—Richard Saul Wurman, in The Employee Handbook of New Work Habits for
46
a Radically Changing World
Anyone with an Internet connection today has access to exponentially
greater quantities of writing, images, sound, and video than anyone on earth
could have imagined just twenty years ago.
—David A. Bell, The New Republic

47

Against this background, consider the environment in which unitary executive theory has become a widely-endorsed and influential
legal justification for the modern “personal” presidency.
In the forty years since Future Shock was published, the volume,
pace, novelty, complexity, and simultaneity of information has, if anything, intensified. In 2000, and again in 2003, researchers at the
Berkeley School of Information Management and Systems estimated
48
the volume of new information created annually. Their findings
were mind-boggling:
• Print, film, magnetic, and optical storage media produced about
18
five exabytes of new information annually. One exabyte (10 , or
1 billion billion, bytes) is roughly the amount of information in
seventy-seven novels—for every person on earth. Five exabytes
represents 37,000 times the information in the Library of Congress’s book holdings—or all the words spoken by humans to
49
date.
• Electronic media—telephone, radio, TV, and the Internet—
contained approximately 17.7 exabytes of new information (out
50
of a much larger total information flow).
46
47

48

49

50

Quoted in PRICE PRITCHETT, THE EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK OF NEW WORK HABITS FOR A
RADICALLY CHANGING WORLD 21 (1994).
David A. Bell, The Colbert Report, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 7, 2009,
http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/the-colbert-report, (reviewing JACOB SOLL,
THE INFORMATION MASTER: JEAN-BAPTISTE COLBERT’S SECRET STATE INTELLIGENCE
SYSTEM (2009)).
UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY SCH. OF INFO. MGMT. & SYSTEMS, HOW MUCH INFORMATION?
(2003),
http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info-2003/
execsum.htm.
This, and the other equivalencies given here, appear on multiple websites including id.
and The Digital Big Bang (Feb. 20, 2008), http://ideonexus.com/2008/02/20/thedigital-big-bang/.
These estimates include audio and visual files, which are considerably larger than the
equivalent information in text form. Still, the quantities involved are so huge that they
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When Toffler wrote, the extension of Internet access to the general public through creation of the World Wide Web was barely on
51
the horizon. In fewer than twenty years, the Web has exploded to
63 billion pages that can be readily retrieved by commercial search
52
53
engines; its total content is vastly larger. The Internet has brought
e-mail, texting, Instant Message, Twitter, and YouTube—–media of
such speed, immediacy, and accessibility that the increased informa54
tion load has profoundly altered our working and social lives.
The depth and scope of cultural change experienced by Americans in the last four decades has been equally momentous. Social,
political, and technological developments have included: the oil crisis, recycling, and global warming; the women’s movement, the fight
for gay rights, and the end of apartheid; personal computers, pocket
calculators, and videogames; fiber optics, lasers, and nanotechnology;
microwave ovens, cable TV, and VCRs; multinational corporations, al
Qaeda, and the TSA; the discovery of black holes, the creation of the
International Space Station, and the demotion of Pluto; facelifts,
MRIs, and organ transplants; the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the USSR, and the recognition of (mainland) China; FedEx,

51
52

53

54

remain sobering even if adjusted down by several orders of magnitude. For example, if
18
6
the estimate of five exabytes, is reduced to five megabytes (i.e., from 10 to 10 ), the
amount of new information annually would still be equivalent to the text of Shakespeare’s
complete works.
The World Wide Web dates from the early 1990s; the technology that evolved into the
Internet developed from research in the early 1970s.
The Size of the World Wide Web, http://www.worldwidewebsize.com/ (last visited Jan.
29, 2010). Search engines construct a database of the Web by using programs called spiders, or Web crawlers, that begin with a list of known Web pages. The spider gets a copy
of each page and indexes it, storing useful information that will let the page be quickly retrieved again later. Any hyperlinks to new pages are added to the list of pages to be
crawled. Eventually all reachable pages are indexed, unless the spider runs out of time or
disk space. Surface Web, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surface_Web (last visited Jan. 29,
2010).
Indexed pages constitute the “surface Web.” A 2001 study estimated that the “deep Web”
is 1000 to 2000 times larger than “surface” content. See Michael K. Bergman, The Deep
Web:
Surfacing Hidden Value (2001), http://www.brightplanet.com/industryinsight/white-papers/. The deep Web can’t be reached for indexing by standard search
engines in many cases because the web pages are generated on the fly (“dynamically”) by
pulling content from databases or other locations in response to specific search requests.
As this description implies, information in the deep Web is retrievable but not easily
quantifiable. Id.
A recent study estimates that the time and distraction involved in managing information
generated through these electronic media occupies a substantial percentage of the work
day of “knowledge workers” and costs the U.S. $900 billion annually in lost productivity.
Julian Sanchez, Report: Info Overload Costs $900 Billion, Blame Mr. Rogers (Dec. 30,
2008),
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20081230-measuring-the-costs-of-infooverload.html.
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Polaroid, and Starbucks; the end of the Cold War, the beginning of
the War on Drugs, and the declaration of the War on Terror; the
Human Genome Project, stem cell research, and cloning; the European Union, NAFTA, and Microsoft; AIDS, anti-smoking campaigns,
and anthrax threats; no-fault divorce, in vitro fertilization, and assisted suicide; cell phones, camcorders, and MP3 players; disco, techno, and emo; CNN, Dr. Ruth, and reality television; the Euro, barcoding, and GPS; Columbine and Oklahoma City, Katrina, and 9/11.
That many of these developments are triumphs rather than tragedies
is largely beside the point: even “good” change creates stress if it is
too swift and fundamental.
In this cognitively demanding, rapidly shifting, frequently bewildering, and increasingly threatening world, Americans maintain a
complex and conflicted relationship with government. We insist that
public agencies and institutions should care for those in need, protect the environment, assure health care for all, police the safety of
food, drugs, and other products, and defend our homes and bor55
ders. Yet, we believe that programs run by government tend to be
wasteful and ineffective, and that regulation of business usually does
56
more harm than good. We are convinced that voting gives us a
57
voice in how government operates. At the same time, we doubt that
government officials care what we think, and increasingly question
58
the ability of the public to make wise political choices. As government takes greater responsibility for our physical, social, and economic well-being, we insist that greater transparency is the touch59
stone of democratic accountability. Yet, more information further
55

56
57

58

59

See, e.g., THE PEW RESEARCH CTR., TRENDS IN POLITICAL VALUES AND CORE ATTITUDES:
1987–2007, at 12–19, 62–63 (2007), available at http://people-press.org/reports/
pdf/312.pdf; see also, Polling Report.com, Health Policy, http://www.pollingreport.com/
health.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2010) (providing multi-year results of various polls on
government provision of health insurance and food and product safety).
See THE PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 55, at 45–47.
See id. at 48 (“Roughly seven-in-ten Americans . . . agree with this statement: ‘Voting gives
people like me some say about how government runs things.’”); AM. NAT’L ELECTION
STUDIES, THE ANES GUIDE TO PUBLIC OPINION AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR: ELECTIONS
MAKE THE GOVERNMENT PAY ATTENTION 1964–2004, http://www.electionstudies.org/
nesguide/toptable/tab5c_2.htm; AM. NAT’L ELECTION STUDIES, THE ANES GUIDE TO
PUBLIC OPINION AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR: GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS INDEX 1964–
2004, http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab5c_3.htm.
See THE PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 55, at 45–50; AM. NAT’L ELECTION STUDIES, THE
ANES GUIDE TO PUBLIC OPINION AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR: PUBLIC OFFICIALS DON’T
CARE WHAT PEOPLE THINK 1952–2004, http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/
toptable/tab5b_3.htm.
See, e.g., Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Heads of Executive Dep'ts
and Agencies, Transparency and Open Gov’t (Jan. 21, 2009), available at
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strains the already overtaxed attentional and cognitive processing re60
sources we need to comprehend what government is doing.
Numerous studies and polls reveal that contemporary Americans
believe fervently in our system of government, while knowing little
61
about the people and processes through which it operates.
Al62
though this lack of civic understanding is often deplored, it is also
not surprising. The United States is the geographically largest and
most heterogeneous democratic country in the world, and the structures through which it is governed are probably the most complicated
63
and confusing of any contemporary democracy. We are committed
to federalism. This means that authority over economic, social, and
personal affairs is dispersed across national, state, and local government entities; the local level, closest to the people, itself comprises a
byzantine jurisdictional tangle of counties, cities, townships, towns,
villages, and school districts. We are also committed to separation of
powers. This means that each of these levels typically has distinct legislative, executive, and judicial bodies, the names and powers of
64
which vary considerably. The administrative agencies, boards, and
commissions also typically found at each level further multiply the
number of governing entities able to make public policy and create
rules with the force of law. And, to complicate matters even further
from the average citizen’s perspective, official entities at one level are
required to obey, even enforce, the legal rules of higher-level entities,
and so the “law” they announce to the public may be an amalgam of
local, state, and national rules. Finally, the scope and content of pol-

60

61

62

63
64

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/TransparencyandOpenGovernment/
(committing new Administration to “transparent,” “participatory,” and “collaborative”
government).
The increasingly problematic relationship between transparency demands and democratic engagement is explored in Oren Perez, Complexity, Information Overload. and Online
Deliberation, 5 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC. 43 (2009).
“The widespread ignorance of the general public about all but the most highly salient
political events and actors is one of the best documented facts in all of the social sciences. . . . Bare majorities know the simplest facts about how government works, and
fewer still hold ‘real’ attitudes toward even the most important political issues of the day.”
Lau & Redlawsk, supra note 31, at 951 (collecting sources) (citations omitted); see infra
Part II.
E.g., Somin, supra note 35, at 416 (“[T]he fact that a majority of American voters with an
opinion on the issue believe that the federal government is too large and powerful and
simultaneously favor increased spending in almost every major area of federal involvement” demonstrates the absence of the minimum knowledge required for meaningful
democratic participation).
See Nelson W. Polsby, On the Distinctiveness of the American Political System, in ALAN BRINKLEY
ET AL., NEW FEDERALIST PAPERS: ESSAYS IN DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 29 (1997).
For example, in New York, “Supreme Court” denotes the trial courts of general jurisdiction. In Massachusetts, the “General Court” is the legislature.

372

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12:2

icy measures no longer reliably match the level of the entity making
them: city councils, thinking globally and acting locally, ban the
65
products of misbehaving foreign countries, while agencies of the national government specify the dimensions of curb ramps on village
66
streets.
With the convoluted structures, overlapping powers, and diffused
responsibility of this system, contrast the elegant simplicity, clarity,
and logic of President-centered government under unitary executive
theory. A single leader possesses the responsibility and power to
oversee modern regulatory government, coordinating, rationalizing,
and correcting its myriad decisions. Unique among public officials,
he is elected by the entire country. He is therefore attuned to the will
of all, rather than beholden to the parochial demands of a few. Congress is inevitably torpid, conflicted, and erratic. His office is intentionally structured for swift, resolute, and purposeful action. Legislators shirk personal responsibility, and administrators hide behind
bureaucratic gibberish. The personal President is readily identifiable,
highly visible, and inescapably accountable to the people, who watch
and listen as he leads the country and addresses the world. Commander of our armed forces, focal point of our intelligence gathering, and head of a cadre of loyal and expert advisers, he commands
the knowledge and the power of the nation.
This account responds powerfully to the uncertainty and overwhelming complexity of modern life. Scholars of the presidency have
long recognized that the modern President serves as an important
67
cognitive aid for Americans; unitary executive theory supplies a coherent and compelling ideological framework for amplifying this effect. The theory rejects the fuzzy contextual reasoning of checks-andbalances for the certainty of roles fixed by separation of powers:
“[the three vesting] clauses appear clearly to divide the world of governmental powers into a finite set of three, . . . each of which is as68
signed to one and only one governmental actor.” It speaks in absolutes: “the Constitution unambiguously gives the President the power

65

66
67
68

E.g., Mary-Rose Abraham, Florida City Tries to Ban Chinese Products, ABC NEWS, Oct. 24,
2007,
http://abcnews.go.com/business/creativeconsumer/Story?id=3765361&page=1
(describing how Palm Bay, Florida attempted to ban products made in China); John Nichols, City Bans Sweatshop Products, THE PROGRESSIVE, May 1997, at 14 (discussing the
North Olmsted, Ohio ordinance banning municipal purchase of sweatshop products).
ADA Standards for Accessible Design, 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. A, § 4.7 (2010).
See, e.g., Fred I. Greenstein, Popular Images of the President, in THE PRESIDENCY 287, 293–94,
(Aaron Wildavsky ed., 1969).
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1377,
1390 n.45 (1994).
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69

to control the execution of all federal laws.” It draws bright lines:
the President’s “power to superintend, control, and ensure the faithful execution of the laws” entails “the power to remove and direct all
70
policymaking subordinates in the executive branch.” It establishes a
leader with unique claims to authority that simultaneously legitimate
his actions (“he, and he alone, speaks for the entire American peo71
ple”) and guarantee the beneficence of his judgments (“[Because]
the national majority coalition. . . . will, by its very nature, be likely to
be moderate, temperate, and just, so too will its agent be likely to be
72
moderate, temperate, and just.”). It is authenticated by appeal to
the wisdom of our ancestors, the plain meaning of our authoritative
73
founding text, and the practice of our forefathers. No wonder that,
over the last thirty years, unitary executive theory as apologia for the
modern “personal presidency” has grown from a sectarian constitutional creed to a mainstream civic religion.
II. IMPOSSIBLE PROMISES
Leaders, even bad ones, can provide a sense of order and certainty in a
disordered and uncertain world.
74

—Barbara Kellerman, Bad Leadership

Overpromising is a danger at any time, but it is a particular danger now
because the public mood is so unsettled.
75

—Peter McNamara, in Divided Government

By emphasizing singularity over multiplicity, absolutism over contingency, and established truth over emergent meaning, unitary executive theory displays the formal criteria of a particularly effective
ideological resolution for the stress of modern civic uncertainty. At
the same time, its principal substantive claims respond directly to core
anxieties about the contemporary American enterprise of selfgovernment. The “democracy claim” assures us that we do continue
69
70
71
72

73
74
75

Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at 570.
CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 7, at 29 (emphasis added).
Calabresi, supra note 3, at 36.
Calabresi, supra note 3, at 67; accord Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Fatally
Flawed Theory of the Unbundled Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1696, 1734 (2009) (“The President must answer to the entire nation and must consider all the effects and penumbras of
executive actions.”).
See supra text accompanying note 7.
KELLERMAN, supra note 44, at 22.
Peter McNamara, Doing One’s Job: A Constitutional Principle and a Political Strategy for an
Uncertain Future, in DIVIDED GOVERNMENT:
CHANGE, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 191, 207–08 (Peter F. Galderisi et al. eds., 1996).
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to govern ourselves, even as our nation has become a global superpower, because we choose our leader through a process that yields a
76
representative of the “entire American people.” The “managerial
claim” promises that this leader can supervise and control the vast
federal domestic and foreign policy machinery that is largely beyond
the ken of the normal citizen, aligning its outputs with the nation’s
(our) interests.
Yet, as the following Parts explain, President-centered government
cannot deliver what it promises—in part because of the very circumstances of modern life that make unitary executive theory so deeply
77
appealing.
A. The Democracy Claim: The President as Representative-in-Chief
[P]eople now and always have wanted their President to be something bigger
than life.
78

—Stephen Hess

Although the democracy claim is a key tenet of unitary executive
theory, its proponents do not offer a single, completely specified
model of exactly how the President comes to be the truest, best representative of all the people of the nation. Three possibilities are fair-

76
77

78

Calabresi, supra note 3, at 36.
A small but determined literature has challenged the claims of unitary executive theory;
in addition to historical critiques cited supra note 7, it includes: Farina, supra note 7; Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through the New Presidentialism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 227 (1998); Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modern State: Why a Unitary,
Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 827
(1996); Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36
AM. U. L. REV. 443 (1987); Thomas O. Sargentich, The Administrative Process in Crisis—The
Example of Presidential Oversight of Agency Rulemaking, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 710 (1993); Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596 (1989); Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks
and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161 (1995) [hereinafter Shane, Political Accountability].
A more recent round of criticism of various aspects of unitary executive reasoning—
perhaps sparked by the prominence of the theory in Bush Administration decision making includes: Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1385 (2008); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009); Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741 (2009); Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist
President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217 (2006); Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263 (2006); Matthew C.
Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53 (2008). See also Thomas J. Cleary, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: The Unilateral Executive and the Separation of
Powers, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 265 (2007).
Quoted in Alison Mitchell, Campaign Trail or Garden Path?, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1995, at E5.
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ly inferred from the literature defending President-centered government:
(1) Instructing our Representative: This account of the representational rapport between President and people is the most straightforward—and the most democratically ambitious. It envisions presidential elections operating as, in effect, national policy referenda.
During the months of campaigning, voters engage in an extraordinary period of nationwide reflection and debate on important do79
mestic and international issues. They then cast their ballots endors80
The
ing a particular policy agenda for the next four years.
victorious presidential candidate thus emerges with a genuine popular mandate to accomplish specific programmatic objectives.
This account underlies the demand for enhanced presidential
81
control over the content of domestic, as well as foreign, policy. It
also can support the familiar political imagery of the President and
82
the people working together to govern.
83
(2) Wise and Faithful Agent of the “National Majority Coalition” : A
second, more democratically modest account, conceptualizes presidential elections as quadrennial occasions for a nationwide coalition
of interests, representing at least 51% of the people, to select its chief
political agent. This account does not depend on all (or even most)
voters having a specific agenda of well-formed policy preferences.
Rather, it sees the events that begin with the caucuses and primaries
and culminate in the general election as a process wherein a majority
of Americans discover the leader best suited (whether by character,

79

80

81

82

83

See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 3, at 74; Steven G. Calabresi, “The Era of Big Government Is
Over”, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1015, 1039 (1998) (reviewing ALAN BRINKLEY ET AL., supra note
63).
See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative
Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 508 (1985) (“Presidents are elected presumably because they
share the policy preferences of a majority of citizens.”); cf. Paul R. Verkuil, The Status of
Independent Agencies after Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J. 779, 799 (arguing that independent agencies “can frustrate [the] democratic process” because “[t]he President is
elected precisely to implement those policies on which he has campaigned”).
See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Management, Control, and the Dilemmas
of Presidential Leadership in the Modern Administrative State, 43 DUKE L.J. 1180, 1193–95
(1994).
Barbara Hinckley’s analysis of presidential speeches from Truman to Reagan, HINCKLEY,
supra note 10, discovered a set of recurring political stories in Presidents’ public speeches.
One of these is that the work of governing is “carried on primarily by the president, the
American people, and the nation.” Id. at 131.
Calabresi, supra note 3, at 67; see also id. (“[M]ost presidents . . . will work every day they
are in office to try to keep their policies in accord with the wise and benevolent preferences of the national majority . . . .”).
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political philosophy, experience, or substantive commitments) to realize their political goals and act consistent with their political beliefs
(however specified or general those might be).
This account appears to be what fuels the strong unitary executive
preference for presidential policy direction vis-à-vis that of Congress—which appears by contrast to be an inferior democratic institu84
tion, affording representation that is necessarily limited and partial.
This account can also support the political imagery of the plebiscitary
85
President speaking, uniquely, for the people of the nation.
86
(3) The Benevolent Dictator : In this third account, presidential
elections are a device for conferring formal authority on a leader
while incentivizing him to exercise this power for the general good
rather than narrow factional interests. This conception is the thinnest in democratic terms: why people vote as they do is unimportant;
no particular proportion of popular support is required, so long as
the constitutionally specified process is followed. The key is that selection of the President requires participation of the whole nation.
This attunes him to “the general national will” and leads him to resist
factional demands for “policies at variance with those the nation as a
87
whole might want.”
84

85

86

87

See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 3, at 36–38; cf. Kagan, supra note 3, at 2336 (arguing that
political actors other than the President have “a far more tenuous connection to national
majoritarian preferences and interests”).
One of the clearest articulations of this idea appears, remarkably, in a 1918 article by
the Director of the Commercial University at Munich, Dr. M.J. Bonn. In the article, Dr.
Bonn attempted to explain the American political system to his countrymen, on the occasion of the U.S. entering World War I:
The President is the choice of the American people. He is far more so than the
Senate or the House of Representatives. The Senate represents individual states.
The members of the House represent particular electoral districts. The President
represents the whole nation, both minority and majority. . . . If the President tries
to exercise an authority superior to that of the Senate and House, this is not a despotic maneuver. His attitude is supported by a feeling that he alone is elected by
the whole nation, which speaks in his name.
M.J. Bonn, A German Estimate of American Opinion, reprinted in 10 LIVING AGE 754, 757
(1918),
available
at
http://books.google.com/books?
id=2wIuAAAAYAAJ&lpg
=PA754&ots=GMg44BGC0n&dq=Bonn%20%22A%20German%20Estimate%20of%20Am
erican%20opinion%22&pg=PA754#v=onepage&q=Bonn%20%22A%20German%20
Estimate%20of%20American%20opinion%22&f=true.
A second political story Professor Hinckley found in modern presidential speeches, see
supra note 82, is that the President, the American people and the nation are one, “linked
by the word ‘we,’ and . . . indistinguishable from one another.” HINCKLEY, supra note 10,
at 131.
This characterization may seem disparaging but it comes directly out of a text important
to unitary executive theory, THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), quoted at infra text accompanying note 140.
Calabresi, supra note 3, at 64 n.105; see, e.g., Kagan, supra note 3, at 2335 (“[B]ecause the
President has a national constituency, he is likely to consider . . . the preferences of the
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This account permits the simultaneous insistence that the President is entitled to virtually complete autonomy and is uniquely motivated to govern in the national interest. No one can direct presidential judgment because the Constitution gives the executive power to
88
the duly elected President alone. However, because he comes to
power only on the vote of the whole nation, the President is motivated to exercise power in ways that further the interests of the na89
tional community as a whole. This account also can support the political imagery of the “personal” President single-handedly carrying
out the work of the government, often in the face of congressional
90
irresponsibility and bureaucratic ineptitude.

88

89

90

general public, rather than merely parochial interests.”); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 3,
at 105–06 (“[B]ecause the President has a national constituency . . . [presidential control]
appears to operate as an important counterweight to factional influence over administration.”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Unitary Executive Interpretation: A Comment, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 313, 320–21 (1993); Geoffrey P. Miller, The Unitary Executive in a Unified
Theory of Constitutional Law: The Problem of Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 201 (1993)
(both identifying the President as uniquely resistant to factional control).
E.g., Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Legal Counsel to William J.
Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and
Taliban Detainees 14 (Jan. 9, 2002), available at http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/
documents/20020109.pdf (“[T]he president is vested with all of the federal executive
power . . . .”); Online Discussion with Steven G. Calabresi, on WashingtonPost.com (June
27,
2008)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/news/
article_full.cfm?eventid=3804) (“The executive power was understood as being quite
broad in 1787, and it is given to the president. Moreover, the Constitution says Congress
can act only when both houses concur and the courts can act only when there is a case
and controversy. Anything the government does that does not involve bicameralism and
presentment or adjudication of a case or controversy is executive and is in the president’s
domain.”).
President George W. Bush expressed the idea most directly. See Interview by Sir David Frost with President George W. Bush (Nov. 16, 2003) (transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/frost/transcript.html) (“I don’t pay attention to polls.”);
George W. Bush, News Conference (Mar. 21, 2006) (transcript available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65409) (responding “Correct” to
reporter’s question: “You’ve said during your Presidency that you don’t pay that much attention to the polls, but—”); Bush: “I’m the Decider” on Rumsfeld, CNN.COM, Apr. 18, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/04/18/rumsfeld/ (“I’m the decider, and I decide what is best.”); cf. BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR: INSIDE THE BUSH WHITE HOUSE
145–46 (2002) (“I’m the commander—see, I don’t need to explain . . . . That’s the interesting thing about being the president. . . . I don’t feel like I owe anybody an explanation.”).
E.g., Calabresi, supra note 3, at 59 (emphasizing the President’s “unique claim to legitimacy” as the only representative “accountable to a national voting electorate and no one
else”); id. at 36 (“The essential ingredient to combating the congressional collective action problem is the President’s national voice, because he, and he alone, speaks for the
entire American people.”).
The third story that, according to Professor Hinckley, pervades modern presidential public rhetoric, see supra notes 82 & 85, is that Presidents work alone, with little help from
Congress, advisers, or agency officials. HINCKLEY, supra note 10, at 131.
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These three accounts differ in the mechanism that produces a
leader in singular rapport with the people of the nation, but each insists that the President is the epitome of democratic representation.
Each also resonates with particular aspects of the modern political
phenomenon that is the “personal” plebiscitary presidency. And, on
closer examination, each rests on a simplified and idealized version
of the American political process that is more mythic than real.
1. “Instructing our Representative”
[T]he greater the size and scope of government, the more voters have to
know if they are to control its policies through the ballot.
91

—Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Idea

There is simultaneously too much information for any person to use
competently, and most people are paying very little attention . . . .
—Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics of "Informed Voter" Ballot
92
Nominations

For presidential elections to function as occasions for citizens to
specify the policy course of government, several conditions must exist: (i) voters have a coherent collection of preferences on important
policy issues; (ii) the slate of presidential contenders includes candidates with clearly articulated policy agendas, at least one of which
substantially coincides with voters’ preferences; and (iii) citizens successfully vote their preferences, casting their ballots for the candidate
whose policy agenda in fact most closely corresponds with their own.
This is the story-book account of how representative democracy
works. Unfortunately, everything we know about voter and candidate
behavior suggests that this story has little relation to what actually
happens in presidential elections.
We can begin with what appears the strongest case for conceptualizing presidential elections as national policy referenda: the 1980s,
which is, not coincidentally, the same political period in which unitary executive theory emerged as a fully formed, coherent ideology.
Three consecutive presidential campaigns offered voters well-defined
and sharply contrasting visions of the appropriate role of the federal
government in regulating business and providing social services. And
the people responded by giving decisive victories to Ronald Reagan
twice (over incumbent Carter in 1980, then Mondale in 1984), and
91
92

Somin, supra note 35, at 431.
Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics of “Informed Voter” Ballot Notations, 85 VA. L. REV.
1533, 1544 (1999).
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then to his Vice President and self-defined successor, George H.W.
Bush (over Dukakis in 1988). This all seems evidence of a nation of
voters using the quadrennial ballot to endorse the Reagan Revolution
of scaled-back domestic programs, increased military spending, free
93
market economics, and social conservatism.
Yet the facts are otherwise. Scholars of public opinion and voting
behavior have repeatedly shown that most Americans in the 1980s did
not support the new conservative agenda that included dismantling
federal regulatory programs. Surveys throughout the period solidly
establish that a majority thought the federal government should be
spending more on education, the environment, healthcare, and the
94
poor. To be sure, the size of this majority was smaller in 1980 than at
95
any previous time since the early 1950s. Significantly, however, the
majoritarian preference for activist regulatory government began to
grow steadily and markedly from the time Ronald Reagan was first
elected. By 1984, when Reagan was reelected by a larger popular vote
96
than in 1980, the proportion of Americans voicing “liberal” regulatory policy preferences had risen to levels considerably higher than
97
when Jimmy Carter won the presidency in 1976. By the 1988 election of George H.W. Bush, this proportion had risen to about the lev-

93
94

95
96

97

George H.W. Bush’s 1988 platform was so conspicuously framed as a continuation of Ronald Reagan’s policies that 1988 has been called Reagan’s third election.
E.g., BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS OF
TRENDS IN AMERICANS’ POLICY PREFERENCES 169–70, 373–74 (1992); MARTIN P.
WATTENBERG, THE RISE OF CANDIDATE-CENTERED POLITICS: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF
THE 1980S 101–10 (1991); Scott L. Althaus, Information Effects in Collective Preferences, 92
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 545 (1998).
See also David E. RePass, Searching for Voters Along the Liberal-Conservative Continuum:
The Infrequent Ideologue and the Missing Middle, FORUM, June 2008, at 16, 45,
http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol6/iss2/art5 (concluding from American National
Elections Studies data, inter alia, that 1980 and 1984 victories did not reflect widespread
voter support for Reagan’s new conservatism). See generally, Christopher Ellis & James A.
Stimson, Pathways to Ideology in American Politics: The Operational-Symbolic “Paradox”
Revisited, 3–4 (Apr. 7, 2005), available at www.unc.edu/~jstimson/Pathways.pdf (using data from 1970–2005 to show that Americans always on average “prefer policies through
which the government does and spends more to solve social problems,” and that this
“clear preference . . . . varies within a relatively small range, never quite touching the neutral point even at its most extreme conservative moments”).
JAMES A. STIMSON, PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA: MOODS, CYCLES, AND SWINGS 68 (2d ed.
1999).
Both voter turnout and Reagan’s margin of victory were higher in 1984. See Dave Liep’s
Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, 1984 Presidential General Election Results,
http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?year=1984&f=0&off=0&elect=0 (last
visited Jan. 29, 2010).
STIMSON, supra note 95, at 68.
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el of the 1964 election, when Lyndon Johnson and his proposed
98
Great Society program beat Barry Goldwater in a landslide.
The 1980s are thus highly problematic for the “Instructing Our
Representative” account of presidential electoral politics, but there is
more. Political scientists Richard Rau, David Anderson, and David
Redlawsk used data from the 1972–2004 presidential elections to
99
measure the extent of “correct voting.” They defined a vote as “correct” if it was cast for the candidate whose expressed issue positions
most closely matched the voter’s collection of expressed, weighted
100
preferences.
Averaging all the elections in this thirty-two year period, they found that “about one-quarter of all voters voted incorrectly,
sending a misleading message about the direction of their prefer101
ences.” The range of “incorrect voting” in the period was set by two
elections that seem particularly important to unitary executive claims:
the highpoint of “incorrect” voting (49% of voters) came in the legendary 1980 victory of Ronald Reagan over incumbent Jimmy Carter;
the low point (15%) came in the notorious 2000 election, when Al
Gore won the popular vote only to lose to George W. Bush in the
102
Electoral College.
The Rau, Anderson, and Redlawsk study is the most extensive on
issue voting in U.S. presidential elections, but its conclusions are con103
sistent with other, more time-limited studies.
Whether we look at
issues that have been politically salient for decades, issues that become prominent in particular presidential campaigns, key political
facts on which voter judgment depends, or simply background understanding of basic civics, crucial gaps and significant errors exist in
104
voter knowledge. Presidential elections may be times of extraordi98
99
100

101
102
103

104

Id. Johnson made the Great Society programs the centerpiece of his domestic policy
agenda in a speech given in the spring preceding the 1964 election.
Lau, Andersen & Redlawsk, supra note 15, at 396, 400.
Drawing data from the long-running American National Election Studies (ANES) survey,
the researchers constructed a measure using (i) information about voter preferences on
specific issues; (ii) information from which relative weight of preferences (i.e., how important each policy issue was to the particular voter) could be gauged; and (iii) information about candidate positions on the issues. Id. at 396–97.
Id. at 406 (emphasis added).
Id. at 401.
E.g., Ilya Somin, When Ignorance Isn’t Bliss: How Political Ignorance Threatens Democracy,
POL’Y ANALYSIS (Cato Institute), Sept. 22, 2004, at 2, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-525es.html (reviewing “the overwhelming evidence
that the American electorate fails to meet even minimal criteria for adequate voter knowledge” on specific issues in 2004 election and on general political knowledge).
For example, deregulation and decreased national government spending were prominent and consistent themes of Ronald Reagan’s campaigns and presidency. Yet, when
the 1988 ANES asked about the pattern of federal spending on the environment, the
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nary national political engagement, but a large proportion of voters
105
still do not know enough to vote their preferences accurately.
From the cognitive perspective, this all makes sense. The federal
policy agenda is wide-ranging, the “facts” about individual issues are
often not only complex but controverted, and the various proposed
solutions frequently involve complicated interdependencies and
trade-offs among incommensurable values. Candidates, whether
from deliberate strategy or less-than-optimal personal communica106
tion skills, are often unclear about their policy positions. Mass me-

105

106

poor, and public schools during the Reagan Administration, fewer than 30% of respondents knew that federal government effort and spending had decreased in all three categories; indeed, in the areas of public schools and environmental protection, more respondents thought the level of federal activity had increased. See MICHAEL X. DELLI
CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS
263–64 (1996); WATTENBERG, supra note 94, at 124–25. Of the remaining respondents,
about half did not know, and half thought spending had remained stable. See id. at 125–
26. In the area of assistance to the poor, a smaller but still remarkable 20.4% thought
federal spending had increased under Reagan. Id. at 124–25. Consistent with the general pattern of public opinion discussed in the text, between 60% and 68% of respondents (depending on the issue) stated that they would disapprove of decreased federal
activity in these policy areas. DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 104, at 263–64. A large
majority of those who favored increased federal efforts and accurately perceived the
Reagan record voted against Bush; a large majority of those who favored increased federal
efforts but inaccurately perceived the Reagan record voted for Bush. Id. at 263–64.
For data from a more recent election, see Kate Kenski & Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Issue Knowledge and Perceptions of Agreement in the 2004 Presidential General Election, 36
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 243 (2006) (using ANES data, voters’ knowledge of candidates’ issue positions was higher than in 2000, but mistakes worked disproportionately to Bush’s
benefit; more people agreed with Kerry’s actual issue positions than Bush’s positions on
five of seven issues examined; controlling for gender, age, race, education, party identification, and ideology, each candidate knowledge item answered correctly was associated
with a 16.8% decrease in the odds of voting for Bush).
On public ignorance about the basic structure and processes of our government, see
SCOTT L. ALTHAUS, COLLECTIVE PREFERENCES IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS: OPINION SURVEYS
AND THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2003); DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 104, 62–104;
John A. Ferejohn, Information and the Electoral Process, in INFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC
PROCESSES 3, 3 (John A. Ferejohn & James H. Kuklinski eds., 1990) (“Nothing strikes the
student of public opinion and democracy more forcefully than the paucity of information
most people possess about politics.”).
Political scientists have largely abandoned the simplistic account of presidential elections
as national policy referenda that can be legitimately interpreted as issue mandates. In the
words of one prominent scholar in the area, “[i]f voting-behavior scholarship were the
Wild West, mandate would have been tarred and feathered, ridden out of town on a rail.”
STIMSON, supra note 95, at 113.
See, e.g., Ian McAllister, A War Too Far? Bush, Iraq, and the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election, 36
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 260 (2006) (examining how “priming”—providing information in
ways that plays into voters’ use of heuristics and other cognitive shortcuts—helped the
Bush Administration compensate for majority disapproval of Iraq war in months leading
up to the November 2004 election); Paul Waldman & Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Rhetorical
Convergence and Issue Knowledge in the 2000 Presidential Election, 33 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q.
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dia and the Internet have radically increased the amount of readily
accessible relevant political information, but they have also increased
the volume of irrelevant “noise” and created new challenges for as107
sessing information accuracy, completeness, and currency. Even if
the only thing Americans did during presidential campaign cycles was
think about politics—a state of affairs as undesirable as it is unlikely—
the attentive and processing capacities of most voters would likely be
overloaded. Some researchers have found evidence that many Americans do not adopt a systematic, consistent belief system that is either
108
conservative or liberal. Such a schema provides a cognitive framework within which to interpret political information efficiently; without one, people find it more difficult to assess competing policy posi109
tions and develop stable, consistent political opinions.
Other
research has underscored that even knowledgeable citizens have difficulty voting their preferences as the political environment becomes
more informationally complex. Lau, Anderson, and Redlawsk found
that the level of education corresponded positively with correct presidential voting unless voting conditions proliferated the number of
required choices—as, for example, when a large number of local referenda are presented in the same election as the presidential ballot.
In such circumstances, the most educated voters were actually substantially less likely than the least educated voters to cast a “correct”
110
vote for President.
Moreover, there is evidence that knowledgeable voters sometimes
deliberately “sacrifice” their preferred position on one or more issues

107

108
109

110

145 (2003) (concluding that rhetorical presentation of issues by both Bush and Gore in
2000 contributed to extremely low public knowledge of candidates’ actual position, a situation that particularly damaged Gore since the voters did not recognize that his issue
stands were actually more aligned than Bush’s with public opinion).
Cf. Bruce W. Hardy, Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Kenneth Winneg, Wired to Fact: The Role of
the Internet in Identifying Deception During the 2004 U.S. Presidential Campaign, in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNET POLITICS 131 (Andrew Chadwick & Philip N. Howard eds., 2009)
(concluding that during the 2004 presidential campaign, citizens who used the Internet
for political information had higher ability to distinguish deception from fact during the
campaign).
E.g., RePass, supra note 94.
Id. Other studies have found that among voters with the least political knowledge, even
the most basic political heuristics (e.g., political party) do not help; in fact, such voters
are likely to make more errors when they employ these heuristics. See Lau, Anderson &
Redlawsk, supra note 15, at 398, 404; Lau & Redlawsk, supra note 31.
The researchers commented: “It is as though the most educated try to make sense of
every different choice they have, but when there are too many choices they become overwhelmed and cannot make a good decision in the presidential election (nor, presumably,
on the referenda, although we have no data on this point).” Lau, Anderson & Redlawsk,
supra note 15, at 405.
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when they cast their ballot. Typically, such voters refuse to cross over
to the candidate of the other party despite disagreeing with their par111
ty’s candidate on one or more issues important to them. That this
happens is hardly surprising. Given the very large number of policy
issues potentially within the President’s sphere of influence, and the
need to choose between only two (very rarely, three) serious contenders, the real surprise would be if many reasonably informed voters could find a candidate whose bundle of policy positions corresponds perfectly to their own set of issue preferences. Such voters
may respond “correctly” to imperfect options—i.e., they may choose
the candidate whose location in a multiple issue space is closest to
112
their weighted preferences.
But the fact that they must select a
candidate despite his position on one or more issues that matter to
them is yet one more commonly observed fact of American political
behavior that undermines the account of presidential elections as extraordinary democratic moments, when citizens instruct their government on their desired policies by choosing a Representative-in113
Chief who mirrors their preferences.
111

112
113

For example, responses from the 1992 ANES revealed that 54% of Republicans and 31%
of Democrats held positions on abortion that clearly conflicted with the announced position of their party’s candidate. See Alan I. Abramowitz, It’s Abortion, Stupid: Policy Voting in
the 1992 Presidential Election, 57 J. POL. 176, 179 (1995). This conflict produced defections
by 17% of Republicans and 6% of Democrats—percentages that reveal abortion as one of
the very few policy issues that have been dispositively salient for an appreciable number of
voters in recent decades. Id. Indeed, Professor Abramowitz’s analysis concluded that
abortion had a stronger effect on candidate choice than any other specific policy issue including the Gulf War. Id. at 184–85. More significant for present purposes, the vast majority of pro-choice Republicans and pro-life Democrats cast their vote for a candidate
whose position on the issue they rejected.
See Edward G. Carmines & James A. Stimson, The Two Faces of Issue Voting, 74 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 78, 78–79 (1980).
Steven Calabresi and Nicholas Terrell argue that being forced to prioritize one’s preferences and make tradeoffs is an affirmative advantage offered by presidential elections because “we ought not only care about what viewpoints get majority support but also how
intensely those viewpoints are held.” Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 72, at 1725. Surely,
though, this reasoning sensibly applies only for policy issues that have reasonably direct
interdependencies. If I believe that government should act more aggressively to clean up
the environment and that abortion should be illegal in all cases, what useful information
to my representative comes from forcing me to choose between these preferences—
unless one believes that responding to single-issue zealotry is the pathway to good government? Cf. Carmines & Stimson, supra note 112 (finding that voters who vote based on
“easy” issues—issues that are symbolic rather than technical, deal with policy ends rather
than means, and have been salient on the political agenda for a long time—resemble the
relatively unknowledgeable and unengaged non-issue voter more than the relatively politically sophisticated “hard issue” voter). Even with respect to preferences that appear
more directly interdependent—e.g., I prefer less government spending and more aggressive government protection of the environment—my choices will often be artificially constrained by the limited array of policy bundles offered by the candidates. I may also pre-
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2. “Faithful Agent of the National Majority Coalition”
Presidential action thus becomes—in a symbolic sense—our action; a
scattered, divided, uncertain people are made one and exercise their
popular power through their surrogate.
—Bruce Miroff, in Rethinking the Presidency

114

This second account of how all the people are represented in
President-centered government appears more promising, for it does
not make the high demands on citizen attention and judgment required in the “Instructing Our Representative” account. Rather, it
relies on the democratic decision principle of majority rule: the prevailing presidential candidate is the one who can inspire the support
of enough Americans to forge a national majority; after he is in office, he will work to remain responsive to a combination of individuals and groups “large enough to keep his approval rating above fifty115
one percent.” This account does not depend on voters having coherent, specific policy preferences that are accurately mapped onto
unambiguously expressed, equally specific issue platforms offered by
presidential contenders. The representational rapport between President and people rests on the formation and cultivation of a nationwide majority coalition, members of which determine who is best
suited to exercise power on their behalf, and then maintain or withdraw their support as they assess his ongoing performance in office.
The bases on which these judgments are made need not be consistent, or even specifiable; the make-up of the coalition need not remain stable. It is enough that a majority of Americans know what
they want when they see it. The invisible hand of the national democratic marketplace does the rest.
But even this more modest account of presidential democracy
founders on basic facts of contemporary presidential politics. Most
fundamentally, modern Presidents are not chosen by anything close

114
115

fer significantly lower military and foreign aid spending (three possible, rationally coherent policies), but discover that no candidate offers this policy triad. This is one of the
most fundamental logical criticisms of attempting to interpret presidential elections as issue mandates. See NELSON W. POLSBY & AARON WILDAVSKY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS:
STRATEGIES AND STRUCTURES OF AMERICAN POLITICS 263–64 (10th ed. 2000) (using nonmathematical application of Arrow’s Theorem to show how “[i]t is possible for a candidate to get 100 percent of the votes and still have every voter opposed to most of the candidate’s policies, as well as having every one of those policies opposed by most of the voters”).
Bruce Miroff, Monopolizing the Public Space: The President as a Problem for Democratic Politics,
in RETHINKING THE PRESIDENCY 218, 223 (Thomas E. Cronin ed., 1982).
Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 72, at 1702.
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to a majority of the country eligible to vote. In recent decades, the
successful candidate has won the presidency on the votes of, on average, fewer than 30% of adult Americans. This is not some complicated
116
artifact of the Electoral College system.
It represents simple (and
routinely ignored) math: the reported popular vote must be adjusted
by voter turnout, which has averaged 55.9% in the presidential elec117
tions since 1980.
Doing the math requires some fairly significant
readjustments in our thinking about presidential “majorities”: the
1980 “mandate” to Ronald Reagan was conferred by 27.5% of eligible
Americans; in 1992, Bill Clinton defeated incumbent George H.W.
Bush on the ballots of 25% of those who could vote; the controversial
2000 victory to George W. Bush rested on 26% of potential voters; in
the historic 2008 election, Barak Obama received the largest proportion of popular support in more than forty years of presidential selec118
tion: 32.6%.
These figures cast a very different representational light on presidential elections. Still, we could accept the “agent of the national majority coalition” account, in substance at least, if we could be assured
that those who vote are themselves a representative cross-section of
eligible Americans. Conventional political science wisdom was indeed that the preferences of presidential voters do not differ significantly from those of nonvoters. The benchmark study was Wolfinger
and Rosenstone’s analysis of data from the 1972 presidential election,
which concluded that the views of voters in the Nixon-McGovern race
were “virtually a carbon copy” of the general population on a range

116
117

118

The impact of that system on presidential representation is discussed in the next Part.
This average uses the most generous calculation of turnout, removing noncitizens and
felons disenfranchised by state law to include only those who could legally have voted. See
United States Elections Project, Voter Turnout, http://elections.gmu.edu/
voter_turnout.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2010). Since 1980, both these categories have increased, so that the “voting age population” is about 9% greater than the “voting eligible
population.” See Michael P. MacDonald, Every Eligible Voter Counts: Correctly Measuring
American
Turnout
Rates,
BROOKINGS
INST.,
Sept.
29,
2004,
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2004/0909elections_mcdonald.aspx.
Turnout rates in the U.S. tend to be among the lowest in industrialized democracies.
See Arend Lijphart, Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma, 91 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 1 (1997). The modern low point was 1996 (Clinton/Dole), in which only 51.7% of
eligible Americans voted. See United States Elections Project, supra.
Reagan (1980): 50.7% of a 54.2% voter turnout; Clinton (1992): 43% of a 58.1% turnout; Obama: 52.9% of a 61.7% turnout. Data on turnout come from the United States
Elections Project, supra note 117. Data on popular vote percentage come from HAROLD
W. STANLEY & RICHARD G. NIEMI, VITAL STATISTICS ON AMERICAN POLITICS 2005–2006, at
12–13 (2005) and Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Elections, http://uselectionatlas.org/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).

386

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12:2

119

of policy issues.
Although other studies generally supported these
120
results, the conclusion that voters and nonvoters have the same policy preferences seemed counter-intuitive at best, for it is wellestablished that voters differ substantially from nonvoters on demographic dimensions that often have political significance: younger
Americans, people of color, the poor, those who are less well educated, and those who are unmarried are consistently and markedly
121
underrepresented among those who cast a ballot.
More recent
work is far more skeptical of the conventional wisdom. Studying data
from the 1972–2004 national elections, Jan Leighley and Jonathan
Nagler conclude that “after 1972, voters and non-voters differ significantly on most issues relating to the role of government in redistributive policies. . . . [V]oters are substantially more conservative than
122
non-voters on class-based issues.”
Studies disaggregating national
opinion at the state and local level have similarly concluded that significant differences exist between the preferences of voters and non123
voters, typically skewed in a conservative direction. Part I reviewed
119
120

121

122

123

RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 109 (1980).
A 2001 review concluded that “[o]ne of the least contested conclusions in the study of
political behavior is that voters’ political attitudes and policy positions are fairly representative of non-voters.” Patrick Ellcessor & Jan E. Leighley, Voters, Non-Voters and Minority
Representation, in REPRESENTATION OF MINORITY GROUPS IN THE U.S.: IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 127 (Charles E. Menifield ed., 2001).
See, e.g., Jan E. Leighley & Jonathan Nagler, Who Votes Now? And Does it Matter? 5
(Mar. 7, 2007), (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/
dept/politics/faculty/nagler/leighley_nagler_midwest2007.pdf); see also ZOLTAN L.
HAJNAL, AMERICAN’S UNEVEN DEMOCRACY: RACE, TURNOUT, AND REPRESENTATION IN CITY
POLITICS (2009) (reviewing literature); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION
ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2004, at 2–3 (2006), available at
IN
THE
http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p20-556.pdf (reporting substantially higher turnout among older, married, well-educated, upper income, and non-Hispanic whites, as
well as geographic differentials for the 2004 election).
Leighley & Nagler, supra note 121, at 18. The authors point out that some earlier studies
did find evidence of policy preference differentials. For example, Bennet and Resnick’s
1990 study of data through 1988 found few voter/nonvoter differences on partisanship,
ideology, and foreign policy, but discovered that nonvoters were “slightly more in favor of
an increased government role in the domestic arena. They are more likely to oppose curtailing government spending for health and education services, and . . . to support government guarantees that everyone has a job and a good standard of living.” Moreover,
nonvoters were significantly more likely to favor spending on core domestic programs.
Stephen Earl Bennett & David Resnick, The Implications of Nonvoting for Democracy in the
United States, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 771, 789–93 (1990).
See, e.g., HAJNAL, supra note 121, at 8 (focusing on local elections, to conclude that “low
turnout results in losses in mayoral elections, less equitable racial and ethnic representation on city councils, and spending policies that are less in line with the preferences of
racial and ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged groups”); Jean-François Godbout &
Mathieu Turgeon, A Matter of Degree: Policy Preferences and the Probability to Vote 1
(Aug. 30, 2008), (unpublished manuscript, available from a link at
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some of the profound social and cultural changes in the United
States since the early 1970s; over that time, the population has be124
come more racially heterogeneous, disparities in economic well125
being have increased, and the proportion of married citizens has
126
decreased while that of older Americans has increased. In the same
period, the policy agenda of the federal government has become
even more ambitious, as such major regulatory initiatives as environmental, workplace, and consumer protection developed. Our understanding of whether and how the preferences of nonvoters differ
from those of voters is still far from perfect, but what we do know
should make us deeply wary of attempts to translate the votes of less
than a third of eligible Americans into the democratic talisman of a
127
“national majority coalition.”
Finally, two other modern political phenomena seem relevant to
the attempt to locate the President’s representational superiority in
the support of a majority of the electorate. The first is the post-World
War II propensity of voters to saddle the President with a Congress
controlled by the opposition party. Few questions of American electoral politics are more contentious than attempts to explain divided
128
government. Some scholars perceive voters engaged in “policy bal-

124
125

126
127

128

http://sites.google.com/site/polgodbout/home/research) (finding “significant, constant, and systematic difference in attitudes on a range of policy issues” and that “as the
probability of voting increases, the likelihood of having conservative views increases”).
The proportion of whites and African Americans has declined relative to Latinos and
Asian-Americans. Leighley & Nagler, supra note 122, at 2 (using 2000 Census data).
Between 1967 and 2001, the proportion of aggregate income held by the richest fifth of
the population increased from 43.8 to 50.1%; the proportion held by the poorest fifth
decreased from 4% to 3.5%. Id. at 2 (using 2000 Census data).
Id.
A more radical proponent of the national majority coalition account might insist that we
should count only those citizens who actually exercise their right to choose their political
agent. Even if this redefinition of the President’s true representational constituency were
accepted, it runs up against the disturbing frequency of modern Presidents who have
been rejected by the majority of voters. Since 1960, five Presidents have come into office
on less than 50% of the popular vote: Kennedy 1960 (49.7%); Nixon 1968 (43.4%); Clinton 1992 (43.0%); Clinton 1996 (49.2%); Bush 2000 (47.9%). By contrast, in the first sixty years of the twentieth century, only three elections produced non-majoritarian winners:
Wilson 1912 (41.8%); Wilson 1916 (49.2%); Truman 1948 (49.5%). Wholly apart from
Electoral College effects, the presence of third party candidates can give us a President
who falls substantially short of persuading a majority of voters that he is best suited to exercise power on their behalf. STANLEY & NIEMI, supra note 118, at 18–20 tbls. 1–7.
Important contributions in the vast literature include BARRY C. BURDEN & DAVID C.
KIMBALL, WHY AMERICANS SPLIT THEIR TICKETS: CAMPAIGNS, COMPETITION, AND DIVIDED
GOVERNMENT (2002); RICHARD S. CONLEY, THE PRESIDENCY, CONGRESS, AND DIVIDED
GOVERNMENT: A POSTWAR ASSESSMENT (2003); MORRIS P. FIORINA, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT
(1992); GARY C. JACOBSON, THE ELECTORAL ORIGINS OF DIVIDED GOVERNMENT:
COMPETITION IN U.S. HOUSE ELECTIONS, 1946–1988, at 115 (1990); DIVIDED
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130

ancing” or even “cognitive Madisonianism.” This latter view—that
voters are, at least to some degree, hedging their representational
bets and consciously dividing power—receives apparent support from
several years of various survey evidence in which a substantial number
of Americans insist the country is better off if the same party does not
131
control both the presidency and Congress. A strong dissenting view
insists that divided government is an unintentional consequence of
particular electoral circumstances, including the shift from a partybased system to candidate-centered politics, incumbency, and cam132
paign financing. Noting the generally low level of political sophistication, the non-intentionalist view questions whether people really
133
understand or mean what the survey evidence seems to be saying.

129

130

131

132
133

GOVERNMENT: CHANGE, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (Peter F. Galderisi, Roberta Q. Herzberg & Peter McNamara eds., 1996) [hereinafter DIVIDED
GOVERNMENT]. Good summaries of the major positions appear in Richard G. Niemi &
Herbert F. Weisberg, Do Voters Prefer Divided Government?, in CONTROVERSIES IN VOTING
BEHAVIOR 271 (Richard G. Niemi & Herbert F. Weisberg eds., 4th ed. 2001); David Hill,
Stephen C. Craig & Elizabeth Christie, Separable Versus Nonseparable Preferences: Citizen Attitudes About Divided Government in the United States (Jan. 8, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p67989_index.html).
The basic idea is that voters use different considerations in voting for different types of
offices. E.g., FIORINA, supra note 128, at 65 (“Essentially, [the voters] have the Republicans bake the economic pie (and protect it from marauding bears and other dangers),
but allow the Democrats to divide it up.”); JACOBSON, supra note 128, at 113 (stating that
the public sees Republicans as better at national defense and handling inflation). These
explanations fit the national political scene better in the 1980s, when Republicans controlled the presidency and Democrats the Congress, than the 1990s, when the pattern reversed, although variations have been suggested; see, e.g., Niemi & Weisberg, supra note
128, at 276 (suggesting that voters might have needed Republican Presidents less once
the Cold War ended).
E.g., Michael S. Lewis-Beck & Richard Nadeau, Split-Ticket Voting: The Effects of Cognitive
Madisonianism, 66 J. POL. 97 (2004). See Everett Carll Ladd, Public Opinion and the “Congress Problem”, 100 PUB. INT. 57, 66–67 (1990) (coining the phrase, and suggesting “[t]he
public wants to set the two parties’ views of government’s role in creative tension”).
A version of the divided government question has been part of the ANES survey for many
years. Gallup has asked about divided government since at least 2000. Lydia Saad, Support Up for Divided Government and Major Third Party, GALLUP, Sept. 14, 2006,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/24502/Support-Divided-Government-Major-ThirdParty.aspx (summarizing results from 2000–2006 of response to question: “Do you think
it is better for the country to have a President who comes from the same political party
that controls Congress, (or do you think it is better) to have a President from one political party and Congress controlled by another?”). A number of other popular and scientific polls have posed the question at various times.
E.g., BURDEN & KIMBALL, supra note 128.
E.g., Lee Sigelman, Paul J. Wahlbeck & Emmett H. Buell, Jr., Vote Choice and the Preference
for Divided Government: Lessons of 1992, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 879, 883 (1997) (concluding
that people who express the divided government preference on the ANES survey were
only slightly more likely than the typical voter to split their ballots); John R. Petrocik &
Joseph Doherty, The Road to Divided Government: Paved Without Intention, in DIVIDED
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Still other researchers conclude that the survey data probably overstate the strength of popular support for deliberately dividing power
but that flawed measurement and data inadequacies prevent a con134
clusive understanding of public attitudes.
Obviously, any conclusion on the “meaning” of divided government is well beyond my
scope here, but the relative infrequency with which the President gets
from voters a predictably “cooperative” Congress is another salient
aspect of national electoral politics that calls into question the simplistic account of a majority coalition of Americans choosing the
President as the one political agent who will reliably further their interests.
The second problematic phenomenon for this account is that
modern Presidents in fact do not reliably manage to keep their policies attuned to the will of enough individuals and groups “to keep
135
[their] approval rating above fifty-one percent.”
The overall average approval rating for the presidencies of Richard Nixon, Gerald
Ford, Jimmy Carter, and George W. Bush all fell below the 50%
136
mark. Of the remaining Presidents over the last four decades, Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton managed to keep their overall average
above 50%, but each had extended periods when considerably fewer
than a majority of Americans approved of the job they were doing;
only George H.W. Bush succeeded in keeping his approval rating
137
above 50% overall, and for most periods of his presidency.
These
are not the patterns of a representative who sees himself as “the con-

134
135
136

137

GOVERNMENT, supra note 128 (finding non-sensible patterns in the survey responses and
concluding that “[p]artisanship and situational rationalization” were more likely explanations than “strategic vision”).
See Hill, Craig & Christie, supra note 128.
Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 72, at 1702.
Presidential Approval Ratings—Gallup Historical Statistics and Trends, GALLUP,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/116677/Presidential-Approval-Ratings-Gallup-HistoricalStatistics-Trends.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2010). Public approval response to President
George W. Bush has been a topic of particular interest. E.g., Richard A. Brody, The American People and President George W. Bush: The Fall, the Rise and Fall Again, FORUM, June 2008
(looking at approval polls from ten polling organizations to conclude that Bush was
unique in the sustained weakness of his level of public support); Waldman & Jamieson,
supra note 106, at 161 (suggesting that the rhetorical framing of the 2000 election, which
produced widespread voter misperception of Bush’s policy agenda vote, fueled public
approval problems from the outset).
Graphs of the time series of Gallup poll data are helpfully collected at Wikipedia. Wikipedia,
United
States
Presidential
Approval,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
United_States_presidential_approval_rating (last visited Jan. 29, 2010). President George
H.W. Bush’s approval ratings topped 50% until a relatively short period during the last
year of his Administration.
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scious agent[ of] a national majority coalition.” The next Part discusses why the constitutional design of the presidency itself defeats
such a conception.
3. The “Benevolent Dictator” Model
[T]he rest of us ought to remember that the politics of winning and
governing often collide.
139

—Robert Samuelson

Neither the informational, attentional, and communication obstacles to interpreting presidential election results as policy referenda,
nor the multiple factors that undermine the claim of presidential majoritarianism, might be fatal to the “democracy claim” of unitary executive theory if the President is the one representative reliably motivated to act decisively for the national good and resist the distorting
influence of faction. Alexander Hamilton sketches the idea in Federalist 70, one of the core texts of unitary executive theory:
Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good
government. It is essential to the protection of the community against
foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the
laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and highhanded combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of
justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of
ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in
Roman history knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge
in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who aspired to
the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the community whose
conduct threatened the existence of all government, as against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the conquest and destruction of
140
Rome.

In the “Benevolent Dictator” account, the President is incentivized
by the very structure of the office to make policy decisions that benefit the whole rather than favoring any regional or interest-group part.

138

139
140

Calabresi, supra note 3, at 67. In making this point, I accept the terms of the argument as
framed by unitary executive theorists. My own view is that constitutionally appropriate
representative behavior by the President falls in between using approval ratings as the
measure of good public policy, and ignoring them.
Robert Samuelson, A Vote for McBama, REAL CLEAR POL., June 11, 2008,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/06/vote_for_mcbama.html.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 421–22 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
This Part is prominently featured in Professor Calabresi’s influential defense of the representational superiority of the unitary executive President. See Calabresi, supra note 3, at
37–38.
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The least democratically demanding explanation of why Presidentcentered government is representationally superior, it requires little
more than that the President recognize the national identity of his
141
constituency. No majority of citizens need vote for or continue to
support the winning candidate; voters need have no particular understanding of the issues. The quadrennial election identifies the
one individual who, from the unique vantage point of responsibility
142
to represent the nation, will deploy power in the interests of all.
This account is as close as it gets to representation without the people.
Yet even this thinnest of representational theories runs up against
the facts. Popular and scholarly opinion may be divided over whether the Electoral College system is one of the Framers’ best, or worst,
143
political innovations, but what cannot be disputed is its success in
focusing the attention of would-be Presidents on geography. Because
population is not evenly distributed across the country, any per-capita
allocation of electors will make high-density regions presumptively
most interesting to the candidate seeking electors. California alone
offers one-fifth of the crucial votes needed for victory—more than the
15 electoral vote-poorest states combined. New York, Texas, and California, with about one-fourth of the nation’s population, represent
144
44% of the magic 270 votes.
The constitutional formula tried to
mitigate such geographical inequities by giving low population states
a boost: electors are allocated on the basis of House plus Senate delegations. However, high-population states regained the advantage by
adopting the winner-take-all “unit rule,” which dangles an entire
145
block of electors in front of presidential hopefuls.
The result is a

141

142

143

144
145

See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 3, at 59 (asserting that the President’s “unique claim to legitimacy” comes from his “being the only official who is accountable to a national voting
electorate and no one else”).
For discussion of the distinction unitary executive literature draws between “the general
national will” and local, state, and national factional interests which advocate “policies at
variance with those the nation as a whole might want,” see Farina, supra note 7, at 989–90,
989 n.8 (citations omitted).
Compare, e.g., ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE CONSTITUTION:
THE CASE FOR PRESERVING FEDERALISM (1994), and Jeff Jacoby, The Brilliance of the Electoral
College, BOSTON GLOBE, July 16, 2008, at A15, with, e.g., GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, WHY THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS BAD FOR AMERICA (2004), and Bradford Plumer, The Indefensible
Electoral College, MOTHER JONES, Oct. 8, 2004, http://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2004/10/indefensible-electoral-college.
See
Federal
Election
Commission,
Distribution
of
Electoral
Votes,
http://www.fec.gov/pages/elecvote.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).
Longley and Peirce’s influential study links this to Jacksonian democracy. LAWRENCE D.
LONGLEY & NEAL R. PEIRCE, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE PRIMER 2000, at 106 (1999).
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system in which some voters are, by virtue of their location, worth a
146
great deal more to presidential contenders than others.
Whether or not presidential voters are rational well-informed actors, presidential candidates—and their campaign advisers—certainly
are: both anecdotal and empirical evidence confirm that campaign
147
strategies are built around the geography of achieving 270 votes.
The precise nature of these strategies has been much debated and
the strategies have evolved over time; here, once again, radical
changes in the information and communications environment are
having significant impact. Initially, attention focused on the extent to
which high-population states reliably received more than their fair
148
share of candidate visits, advertising, and other resources.
Then,
the impact of political competitiveness was factored into the models
149
constructed by elections researchers —and, as several of the traditional electoral mega-states have been relegated to “safe” status (e.g.,
New York to Democrats, Texas to Republicans), candidates indeed
have focused on the relatively small group of “battleground” states in
150
which the outcome is doubtful. In the most recent elections, mass
media communications and the ease with which information now can
be collected, analyzed, and disseminated digitally, is enabling even
more precise regional focusing: comparatively cheap, easy polling
146

147

148

149

150

See, e.g., Lawrence D. Longley & James D. Dana, Jr., New Empirical Estimates of the Biases of
the Electoral College for the 1980s, 37 W. POL. Q. 157 (1984) (finding advantages in the 1980s
to Hispanic, Jewish, urban, Far West, and Eastern voters, and disadvantages to voters in
Mountain, Southern, and Midwestern states as well as to blue-collar, rural, and Black voters).
Cf. Lau, Andersen & Redlawsk, supra note 15, at 404–05 (including in multivariate analysis of “correct voting” the number of candidate visits and political ads in state, and finding
that “[h]olding other variables [constant], this translates into an increased probability of
a correct vote of about 12% in battleground states where both candidates are blanketing
the airwaves with ads, compared to states that the candidates are largely ignoring”).
E.g., Steven J. Brams & Morton D. Davis, The 3/2’s Rule in Presidential Campaigning, 68 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 113 (1974) (modeling disproportionate impact of large-state voters and
finding predictive fit with actual candidate behavior); Claude S. Colantoni, Terrence J.
Levesque & Peter C. Ordeshook, Campaign Resource Allocations Under the Electoral College, 69
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 141 (1975) (reexamining the Brams & Davis data; agreeing that Electoral College affects campaign resource-allocation decisions, but concluding that strategic
model is more complex and multi-factored).
E.g., George Rabinowitz & Stuart Elaine MacDonald, The Power of the States in U.S. Presidential Elections, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 65 (1986) (employing a “pivotal player” analysis that
adjusts size for “political competitiveness” and concluding that California, Texas, Illinois,
and Ohio are substantially more important in presidential elections than warranted by
simply population).
See David A. Hopkins & Darshan J. Goux, Repealing the Unit Rule? Electoral Vote Allocation and Candidate Strategy (Apr. 3, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/6/6/3/9/p266390_
index.html).
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plus targeted cable media advertising and Internet-based campaign
outreach allow candidates to identify communities and interests that
151
could decide key states.
In sum, the constitutionally ordained method of selection itself assures that presidential candidates will be fully attuned to regional politicking, and modern information and communication technology
has amplified this effect. As one observer puts it, “a wise presidential
campaign strategist sees the political map as the intersection of bat152
tleground states and media markets.” A subsidiary (but, in the present context, especially important) consequence of most states’
adopting the unit rule for allocating their electors is that a plurality
victory is as good as sweeping the state. Thus, the rational candidate
knows he need not appeal to a majority of a state’s voters, so long as
he can assemble a coalition of interests large enough to allow him to
153
beat his closet rival. With the growing ability to pinpoint the groups
who can contribute to that coalition, and execute an outreach strategy targeted specifically to them, the would-be President comes into
154
office thoroughly enmeshed in interest-group politicking.

151

152
153

154

See DARON R. SHAW, THE RACE TO 270: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE CAMPAIGN
STRATEGIES OF 2000 AND 2004, at 61 (2006) (account, by elections researcher and adviser
to Bush 2000 and 2004 campaigns, of how campaigns routinely “calculated the relative
cost efficiency of advertising for each of the media markets within our list of battleground
states;” this ranking drove media expenditures); see also Darshan J. Goux, A New Battleground? Media Perceptions and Political Reality in Presidential Elections, 1960–2004, at
15–16
(Aug.
31
2006)
(unpublished
manuscript,
available
at
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/5/2/4/8/p152483_
index.html) (finding that candidates have targeted “key states” for many years, but noting
that technology—including “household-by-household computer analyses, targeted cable
media buys, and other technologies”—provides targeting opportunities earlier campaigns
lacked).
Michael John Burton, Book Review, 122 POL. SCI. Q. 511, 512 (2007) (reviewing SHAW,
supra note 151).
See Cynthia R. Farina, Faith, Hope, and Rationality or Public Choice and the Perils of Occam’s
Razor, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109, 125–30 (2000) (discussing reasons why a candidate perceives “a patchwork of potential interest coalitions, whose utility to him depends upon a
combination of their geographical location and concentration, and their marginal value
in assembling a plurality within the state”).
The Bush 2000 and 2004 campaigns found that the “media buys” and other campaign
activity that resulted from calculating the “relative cost efficiency” of putting resources into the various “media markets” within their battleground states had a positive, often significant impact on both vote share and voter perception of candidate favorability. SHAW,
supra note 151, at 137. See also Daron R. Shaw, The Effect of TV Ads and Candidate Appearances on Statewide Presidential Votes, 1988–96, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 345 (1999) (finding
evidence that candidate TV advertising and appearances from 1988, 1992, and 1996 campaigns affected statewide preferences as well as the Electoral College vote).
The Lau, Andersen & Redlawsk study, supra note 15, determined that “correct” voting
correlated positively with the more heavily presidential candidates campaigned in the
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It would be an heroic assumption indeed to believe Presidents,
once they take office, shed the regional sensitivities and interestgroup commitments that got them elected, as easily as a snake sheds a
shabby and confining skin. Anecdotal evidence certainly suggests
that they, and their close advisers, are specially responsive to the individuals and groups who helped “deliver” the previous election, or
155
might be crucial to winning the next one.
Moreover, a growing
body of modeling and empirical analyses confirms that Presidents
156
tend to behave consistently with basic tenets of political economy.
157
Examination of use of the veto power, grantmaking by executive
158
159
agencies, and other federal spending has found evidence that re-

155

156

157

158

159

state, presumably because this increases the amount of salient information available to
voters.
“You can’t beat an incumbent president. Remember, he’s got a hundred billion dollars
at his disposal to distribute back to local governments, and he can send that money anywhere he wants. Everybody from Alabama to Alaska files for projects, and the administration decides which ones to approve. In an election year, they go where the votes are.”
THOMAS P. O’NEILL, JR. & WILLIAM NOVAK, MAN OF THE HOUSE: THE LIFE AND POLITICAL
MEMOIRS OF SPEAKER TIP O’NEILL 326 (1987); see e.g., Joseph A. Pika, Interest Groups: A
Doubly Dynamic Relationship, in PRESIDENTIAL POLICYMAKING: AN END-OF-CENTURY
ASSESSMENT 59 (Steven A. Shull ed., 1999); Joseph A. Pika, Interest Groups and the Executive:
Presidential Intervention, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 298 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A.
Loomis eds., 1983).
Under the incentive-based “battleground hypothesis,” Presidents favor states that are
competitive between the parties, as a way to woo electoral votes in coming elections; under the reward-based “presidential-support” hypothesis, Presidents steer spending to
states that provided relatively large proportions of popular votes in the previous election
to cement future support. For an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature see
Valentino Larcinese, Leonzio Rizzo & Cecilia Testa, Allocating the U.S. Federal Budget to the
States: The Impact of the President 68 J. POL. 447, 447–49 (2006); Andrew J. Taylor, The Presidential Pork Barrel and the Conditioning Effect of Term, 38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 96 (2008).
See Kevin B. Grier, Michael McDonald & Robert D. Tollison, Electoral Politics and the Executive Veto: A Predictive Theory, 33 ECON. INQUIRY 427, 428 (1995) (finding “significant evidence” that “presidential veto decisions are influenced by the floor votes of senators
from . . . electorally crucial states” through a sample of bills from 1970–1988); see also Nolan M. McCarty, Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics, 94 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 117, 118 (2000) (challenging the “assumption of presidential universalism when
applied to budgetary politics” and modeling how the veto can affect both overall level of
spending and the distribution across political jurisdictions).
E.g., Thomas A. Garrett & Russell S. Sobel, The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments,
41 ECON. INQUIRY 496 (2003) (examining data from 1991–1999 to show that nearly half
of Federal Emergency Management Agency disaster relief is politically motivated, with
states that are politically important to the President receiving a disproportionately large
share of disaster declarations and expenditures).
E.g., Larcinese, Rizzo & Testa, supra note 156 (using data from 1982–2000 to show a disproportionate flow of federal funds to those states that heavily supported the President in
the prior election and states with governors of the President’s party); Walter R. Mebane,
Jr. & Gregory J. Wawro, Presidential Pork Barrel Politics (July 13, 2002) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~wmebane/targeting.pdf)
(finding that “presidents pursue strategies to target federal expenditures to local areas to
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sources are allocated strategically to electorally crucial regions—as
Bush Administration Deputy Chief of Staff Karl Rove put it, “asset de160
Presidents, it seems, are not immune to the problem
ployment.”
that plagues every other elected official: reconciling the representational duty of even-handed public-regardingness with the political
need to reward past, and secure future, support. In this, as in most
things having to do with the presidency, only the scale is different.
For the President, the nation is his pork barrel.
B. The President as Manager-in-Chief: The Good Government Claim
What Presidents do every day is to make decisions that are mostly thrust
upon them, the deadlines all too often outside their control, on options
mostly framed by others, about issues crammed with technical complexities
and uncertain outcomes.
161

—Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents

The second promise of unitary executive theory is that strong
presidential leadership will bring informed coordination and purposeful efficiency to the unrestrained, chaotic sprawl of modern regulatory government. As with the democracy claim, the management
claim is an assertion of uniquely presidential capacity vis-à-vis the other
branches. Unitary executive theorists are wont to disparage congressional oversight as not only erratic but also riddled with parochial and
162
other narrow factional bias.
Even judicial review of agency action
comes under fire for intermeddling with presidential prerogatives,
except to the extent that the court is protecting traditional property
163
and liberty interests from regulatory depredations.

160

161
162
163

promote their goals of reelection and preservation of a policy legacy” using 1985–1988
county-level data). See also John Mark Hansen, Individuals, Institutions, and Public Preferences over Public Finance, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 513, 526 (1998) (using mid-1990s data to
examine how different representative institutions reflect public preferences and concluding that “Electoral College mathematics works modestly to the advantage of defense
spending”). But see Taylor, supra note 156 (finding no presidential electoral effect in distribution of procurement spending).
John Solomon, Alec MacGillis & Sarah Cohen, How Rove Harnessed Government for GOP
Gains, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2007, at A1 (reporting an alleged strategy of “staging of official announcements, high-visibility trips and declarations of federal grants” through the
White House political affairs office “to ensure the maximum promotion of Bush’s reelection agenda and the Republicans in Congress who supported him”).
RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE POLITICS
OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 209 (1990).
E.g., Calabresi, supra note 3, at 34–36, 84–86; Easterbrook, supra note 87, at 318–19; Lessig
& Sunstein, supra note 3, at 93–106.
See Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article II Nondelegation Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
781, 785–92 (2009) (discussing emergence of this interpretation of Article II as a limit on
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This Hamiltonian “good government” claim about Presidentcentered government is distinct from the claim that the President
should control regulatory policy because he alone represents all the
people. Ultimately, however, the two merge. Few informed observers
disagree that U.S. regulatory policy would benefit from coordinating
related programs, rationalizing the exercise of overlapping statutory
jurisdiction, minimizing conflicting regulatory requirements, and
generally ensuring that agencies are working through problems in
ways that most effectively deploy finite public and private resources.
This sort of managerial rationality is not what fuels scholarly and political debates over the extent of presidential power. The controversy
comes, as we move into the realm of setting regulatory priorities, determining how benefits, costs, and risks will be assessed, favoring (or
disfavoring) certain regulatory objectives, and deciding whether and
how resources will be allocated to enforcement. In these areas, “better” regulatory government becomes harder to define without reference to specific substantive preferences and political philosophies.
Unitary executive’s managerial claim insists upon presidential control
in these areas as well, building on the representational claim that the
President’s policy agenda best expresses the people’s will and nation’s interests. In this way, the solution to how the people can meaningfully be represented in modern regulatory government becomes
inextricably intertwined with the promise that presidential direction
means coordinated, efficient, and effective regulatory policy.
1. The Magnitude of the Task
The President is the most overworked and underinformed decisionmaker in
the American policymaking system.
—Rachlinksi & Farina, Cognitive Psychology & Optimal Government Design

164

Information is to decision making what fuel is to fire. Too much or too little
can be equally devastating.
—Review of Groupthink or Deadlock: When Do Leaders Learn from their
165
Advisors?

164

review of agency action); cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (describing statutory attempts to confer standing to challenge agency action on persons other than those who suffered the “invasion of a legally protected interest” as invading the
President’s Article II power).
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 601 (2002).
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The impressive trappings of the office and the often deliberate
166
cultivation of a larger-than-life presidential image tend to obscure
an elemental fact: the President faces the same cognitive challenges
as the rest of us in managing information flows, prioritizing multiple
demands for attention, and comprehending and analyzing novel situations. More accurately, these demands are vastly more onerous, relentless, and insistent on the President than on any other American—
and, perhaps, on any other individual on the planet. He overlooks an
issue universe that spans all substantive policy areas, extends to critical international as well as domestic problems, and presents an ex167
traordinary number of high stakes decision points.
What is entailed in “managing” U.S. regulatory policy? At the
formal level, thousands of statutes delegate regulatory power to hun168
dreds of administrative units with formal policymaking authority.
These are located in fifteen Cabinet departments, dozens of independent commissions, and various other free-standing entities.
These entities exercise their regulatory power through an array of
procedural mechanisms. The most important, and public, of these
include: promulgating regulations with the binding force of law
(rulemaking); issuing “guidance” documents that state the agency’s
interpretation of its statutes and rules and announce its policy on en169
forcement or other matters; adjudicating charges of regulatory vio-

165

166
167

168

169

Bryan W. Marshall, Book Review, 33 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 251, 251 (2003) (reviewing
PAUL A. KOWERT, GROUPTHINK OR DEADLOCK: WHEN DO LEADERS LEARN FROM THEIR
ADVISORS? (2002)).
See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
One of the best discussions of the complexity within which the modern President is embedded appears in BRADLEY H. PATTERSON, JR., THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF: INSIDE THE
WEST WING AND BEYOND 9–21 (2000).
Between 160 and 200 distinct regulatory entities have statutory authority to issue regulations. The White House E-Government Office regularly refers to “more than 160 rulemaking entities” with rulemaking authority, see, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REPORT
TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS OF THE PRESIDENT’S E-GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES, FISCAL
YEAR 2009, at 11 (2008) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/
egov_docs/FY09_Benefits_Report.pdf, but this count excludes many independent commissions. The total number of federal entities with statutory missions is considerably larger than the number of entities with rulemaking authority. See OFFICE OF THE FED.
REGISTER NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MANUAL 2008/2009, at 103–579, 657–65 (2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
gmanual/browse-gm-08.html.
For example, the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration issues six different varieties of regulatory guidance:
Preambles, “generally applicable . . . interpretations or policy statements,” guidance letters to specific individuals or entities, “[o]ral [g]uidance [s]tatements by [s]enior [a]gency [o]fficials,” grant guidelines,
and compliance guides. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, About NHTSA,
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/portal/site/nhtsa/menuitem.c9b5cf87605c4e5033ed6830343c
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lations; and resolving applications for permits, licenses, benefits, and
grants. Less public, but not necessarily less significant, exercises of
authority include: ruling on petitions for rulemaking and requests
for enforcement action, setting enforcement priorities, and allocating
budget resources among programs. Although most agencies use
most of these methods, cross-government harmonization of regulatory practices exists at only a fairly high level of generality. Even in
rulemaking—the most public, legally specified, and formally significant exercise of regulatory authority—the terminology, procedural
details, and information disclosure policies differ significantly from
170
agency to agency.
Hence, the President attempting to manage regulatory government looks out over a vast enterprise comprising a huge portfolio of
economic, health, safety, and social issues, being acted upon by hundreds of distinct entities composed of 2.1 million full-time civilian
employees, and having distinctive internal structures and decisionmaking processes and largely unstandardized operating procedures
and information reporting practices. This lack of uniformity, coupled with a dearth of meaningful government-wide reporting requirements, makes it difficult reliably to generate even basic meas171
ures of the amount of federal regulatory activity. The snapshot that
follows therefore has an element of randomness (in, for example,
which agencies are included and the time period of their data), but it
gives at least an impressionistic sense of the magnitude of federal
regulatory decision making to be “managed.” For several items, a per
44cc/. See generally OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
OMB BULL. NO. 07-02, FINAL BULLETIN FOR AGENCY GOOD GUIDANCE PRACTICES (2007),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07-07.pdf (describing the nature of, and variations in, agency guidance).
170

This became apparent when the George W. Bush administration decided to build a government-wide online electronic rulemaking docket. The rulemaking process is heavily
regulated by statutory and judicial administrative law, as well as presidential executive order. So, one might expect a fair degree of standardization. In fact, inter-agency variation
has bedeviled efforts to create a cross-agency system with more than skeletal capabilities.
See COMM. ON THE STATUS AND FUTURE OF FEDERAL E-RULEMAKING, ACHIEVING THE
POTENTIAL: THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL E-RULEMAKING 17–19 (2008), available at
http://ceri.law.cornell.edu/documents/report-web-version.pdf.

171

This fundamental data problem leads analysts to use the number of pages in the Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) or the Federal Register as a proxy for quantum of federal regulation. See, e.g., John W. Dawson, Regulation and the Macroeconomy, 60 KYKLOS 15, 16–17
(2007) (reviewing studies). For a rough sense of the amount of regulatory activity completely invisible to these measures, see the remarkable collection of resources on “administrative actions which are outside the scope of the CRF or [Federal Register]” maintained
by the University of Virginia Library, Government Information Resources: Administrative
Decisions & Other Actions By Agency, http://www2.lib.virginia.edu/govtinfo/
fed_decisions_agency.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).
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week average is included; this is an heuristic to make the problem of
regulatory “information load” more concrete, rather than any sort of
descriptive claim about the frequency or regularity of agency output.
• New agency regulations promulgated annually: 3500–4000 (67–
172
77 per week). In the first 10.5 months of 2009, about 500 of
these (11 per week) were considered important enough to be
reviewed by the Office of Regulatory Information (OIRA) in the
173
White House Office of Management & Budget (OMB).
Of
this subset, about 100 (2 per week) are “economically signifi174
cant” rules that require full OIRA review of costs, benefits, etc.
• Civilian full-time executive branch employees (FY2010 esti175
mate): 2.12 million
• Number of bureaus, divisions, units, and programs listed in the
directory of the Department of Health & Human Services:
176
more than 3000
• Interpretive rules/other guidance:

172

173

174

175

176
177

178

o

Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (HHS): “thou177
sands” annually;

o

FDA (2003): 105 (2 per week);

178

See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, DRAFT 2008 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND
COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND
TRIBAL ENTITIES 7 (2008), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/
costs_benefits/2008_draft_cb_report.pdf; John Ashlin et al., Regulations.gov Federal Regulatory Portal, 30 J. GOV’T INFO. 81, 82 (2004).
See
RegInfo.gov
EO
Review
Counts,
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eoCountsSearchInit?action=init (last visited Jan. 29, 2010). The numbers reported here
are obtained by running the search with dates January 1, 2009 and November 15, 2009.
Totals during the George W. Bush Administrations ranged from a low of 583 (in 2000) to
a high of 715 (in 2003).
Id. “Economically significant” rules are those that “[h]ave an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of
the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or
State, local, or tribal governments or communities.” Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 2(f), 50
Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). In 2009, average OMB review time has been thirty-two
days for significant rules and forty days for others.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT,
FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 335 tbl.17.1 (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/BUDGET-2010-TAB/pdf/BUDGET-2010-TAB.pdf.
PATTERSON, supra note 167, at 18.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES,
EXECUTIVE ORDER GUIDANCE: OVERVIEW (2007), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
EOG/01_Overview.asp#TopOfPage.
Erica Seiguer & John J. Smith, Perception and Process at the Food and Drug Administration:
Obligations and Trade-Offs in Rules and Guidances, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 17, 26 (2005).
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o

EPA (1996–1999): “over two thousand”;

o

OSHA (2008):
(1.5 per week)

66 interpretations

180

179
181

and 16 directives

• Enforcement Activity
o

EPA (2008): 20,000 inspections (384 per week); 2056 administrative complaints (39 per week); 280 cases referred
for civil enforcement (5 per week); 319 environmental
182
crime cases initiated (6 per week)

o

OSHA (2007): 39,324 inspections (756 per week)

o

FDA (2008): 15,245 inspections (293 per week); 17,907
import refusals (344 per week); 2,721 recall events (52 per
week); 445 warning letters (8.5 per week); 369 convictions
184
(7 per week); 8 seizures

183

• Administrative Orders

179

180

181

182

183

184

185
186

o

EPA (2008): 2084 penalty orders (40 per week); 1390
185
compliance orders (27 per week)

o

OSH Review Comm. (2007): 2058 cases disposed of (39
186
per week)

Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 397, 399 (2007) (citing COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, NON-BINDING LEGAL EFFECT OF
AGENCY GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS, H.R. REP. NO. 106-1009, at 5 (2000)).
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., STANDARD
INTERPRETATIONS
(2008),
available
at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/
owasrch.search_form?p_doc_type=INTERPRETATIONS&p_toc_level=2&p_keyvalue=DA
TE_2008&p_status=CURRENT.
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., DIRECTIVES (2008),
available
at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owasrch.search_form?p_doc_type=
DIRECTIVES&p_toc_level=2&p_keyvalue=DATE_2008&p_status=CURRENT.
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ANNUAL RESULTS FY2008:
NUMBERS AT A GLANCE (2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/
reports/endofyear/eoy2008/2008numbers.html.
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., OSHA ENFORCEMENT:
STRIVING FOR SAFE AND HEALTHY WORKPLACES, available at http://www.osha.gov/dep/
enforcement/enforcement_results_07.html.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FISCAL YEAR 2008 ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS SUMMARY, available at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/EnforcementStory/default.htm.
2008 figures are considerably lower in virtually all these categories than in prior years. See
Eric F. Greenberg, Checking in on FDA Enforcement Stats, PACKAGING WORLD MAG., at 22
(Apr. 2009), available at http://www.packworld.com/article-27319 (compiling and graphing earlier year FDA data).
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 182.
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REVIEW COMM’N, FY 2007
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REPORTS AND
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• Currently active agency requests to collect information from
the public (each of which, under the Paperwork Reduction Act,
must be approved by OMB initially, and every three years there187
188
after ): 8780 (168 per week)
• Agency proposed draft bills cleared by OMB (per Congress):
189
350–500
• Proposed reports/testimony cleared by OMB (per Congress):
190
3500–4000
• Pages in the Federal Register: 80,700 (1552 per week)

191

This is a rough, obviously incomplete picture of the basic information load generated by the federal regulatory enterprise, but it conveys the immensity of the task of supervision. Thanks to the Unified
192
Regulatory Agenda, the White House now has a reasonably good
tool for tracking rulemaking activity, and OMB is attempting to moni193
But would-be
tor the issuance of at least “significant” guidance.
managers of regulatory policy still have no mechanism for systematic,
cross-agency monitoring of administrative adjudication, the granting
of permits and licenses, the denial of petitions for rulemaking, enforcement practices, etc. To be sure, a great deal of this regulatory
activity concerns (relatively) minor matters that may not merit White

187
188

189

190

191
192

193

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (2007), available at http://www.oshrc.gov/performance/
07perfrpt.pdf.
See 44 U.S.C. § 3507 (2006).
U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS
INVENTORY OF CURRENTLY APPROVED INFORMATION COLLECTIONS, available at
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAReport?operation=5 (total as of December
2009). These produce more than 64 billion responses annually, at an estimated annual
cost of more than $57 billion. Id.
This range comes from summaries provided by OMB at the outset of the G.W. Bush and
Obama Administrations, respectively. See Memorandum from Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Dir.
to the Heads of Dep’ts and Agencies, Legislative Coordination and Clearance (Feb. 15,
2001), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/memoranda/m0112.html; Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir. of Office of Mgmt. & Budget to Heads
of Dep’ts and Agencies, Legislative Coordination and Clearance (Jan. 27, 2009), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/memoranda_fy2009/m09-09.pdf.
This range comes from summaries provided by OMB at the outset of the G.W. Bush and
Obama Administrations, respectively. See Memorandum from Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., supra note 189; Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, supra note 189.
73 Fed. Reg. 80,700 (Dec. 31, 2008), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/
su_docs/fedreg/a081231c.html.
See GPO ACCESS, THE UNIFIED AGENDA:
MAIN PAGE (2009), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/ua/index.html (“[The Unified Agenda] summarizes the rules
and proposed rules that each Federal agency expects to issue during the next year.”).
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 169.
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House-level attention, but this simply increases the challenges of informational triage.
Moreover, managing the policy output of administrative agencies
is by no means all that the modern President undertakes to do. As
well as being head of the government, he is expected also to be head
of state and leader of his party. The following are some indicators of
the informational and attentive demands of those other roles:
• Relations with Congress (2008 unless otherwise noted)
o Measures introduced in House and Senate: 4815 (92.5 per
194
week)
o Statements of Administration Position on pending legisla195
tion (2007): 142 (2.7 per week)
196

o Votes: 472 House; 215 Senate

o Measures Passed: 1588 (30.5 per week)

197

198

- Vetoes: 4

- Average annual Bush Administration signing statements
199
issued: 19
o Budget
- Smallest Cabinet Department budget (Interior, 2010
200
est.): $11.9 billion
- Largest Cabinet Department budget (Health & Human
201
Services, 2010 est.): $873 billion
o Nominations
202

- Civilian: 3632 (70 per week)
194
195

196
197
198
199
200

201

154 CONG. REC. D1336 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 2009), available at http://www.senate.gov/
reference/resources/pdf/110_2.pdf.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, STATEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY INDEX, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/rewrite/legislative/sap/110-1/index-date.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).
154 CONG. REC. D1336 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 2009), available at http://www.senate.gov/
reference/resources/pdf/110_2.pdf.
Id. These include bills and joint, concurrent, and simple resolutions.
Id.
See Joyce A. Green, List of All Signing Statements Issued by George W. Bush,
http://www.coherentbabble.com/listGWBall.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 409, tbl.27.1 (2009), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2010-PER/pdf/BUDGET-2010-PER-1-7-1.pdf.
Id. at 288.
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203

- Military: 18,674 (359 per week)
• Foreign Affairs

o Treaties and executive agreements: 136 (2.6 per week)
o Foreign personal appearances annually:
205
month)

204

32 (2.6 per

• Public
206

o Presidential speeches: 23 (2 per month)

207

o News conferences: 18 (1.5 per month)

o Other non-partisan public appearances:
208
month)

298 (25 per

o Partisan political appearances: 65 (5 per month)
• Executive orders: 37 (3 per month)

209

210

In sum, the task of overseeing contemporary U.S. government is
almost incomprehensibly huge. To monitor and assess the current
stream of information relevant to policy formulation—let alone to interpret, synthesize, and formulate a position on this typically complex
and often conflicting flow—is a task for an institution, not an individual. An institution is, accordingly, what the modern presidency
has become.
2. The Presidential Branch
The Constitution includes not a word about the White House staff, and they
are barely mentioned in statute. Staff members have zero legal authority in
their own right, yet 100 percent of presidential authority passes through
their hands.
—Bradley H. Patterson, Jr., The White House Staff: Inside the West Wing and
211
Beyond

202

203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210

154
CONG.
REC.
D1336
(daily
ed.
Jan.
2,
2009),
available
at
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/110_2.pdf. Of these, 3229 were confirmed, and 403 withdrawn or rejected. Id.
Id. Of these, 18,556 were confirmed, and 118 withdrawn or rejected. Id.
RAGSDALE, supra note 10, at 427 (averaging data from 2001–2004).
Id. at 197 (averaging data from 2001–2007).
Id. at 190, 199 (averaging data from 2001–2007).
Id. at 194 (averaging date from 2001–2007).
Id. at 201, 203 (averaging data from 2001–2007).
Id. at 205 (averaging data from 2001–2007).
Id. at 453–54 (averaging data from 2001–2007).
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With the bureaucratizing of the presidency, it is hardly surprising that the
White House fell heir to all the problems of a bureaucracy, including the
distortion of information as it passes through the chain of command . . . .
212

—Stephen Hess, Organizing the Presidency

In contemporary political and constitutional mythmaking about
the presidency, the President works alone—a solitary leader who
makes the hard choices, does what needs to be done, and bears by
himself the weight of power and responsibility. Political scientist
Hugh Heclo contrasts the reality:
Our most familiar image of the presidency finds a man, sitting alone, in
the dimly lit Oval Office. Against this shadowy background the familiar
face ponders that ultimate expression of power, a presidential decision.
It is a compelling and profoundly misleading picture. Presidential
decisions are obviously important. But a more accurate image would
show a presidency composed of at least a thousand people—a jumble of
personal loyalists, professional technocrats, and bureaucratic staff with
one man struggling, often vainly, to stay abreast of it all. What that familiar face ponders in the Oval Office is likely to be a series of conversations
with advisers or a few pages of paper containing several options. These
represent the last distillates produced from immense rivers of information flowing from sources—and condensed in ways—about which the
213
president probably knows little.

Stories about a cast of thousands do not capture the popular imagination in the same way as the struggles of a lone protagonist. But the
managerial promises of unitary executive theory cannot be assessed
without understanding the role of White House staff and other political appointees in constructing the modern presidency.
American Presidents have never tried to manage the information
and expertise demands of government on their own. The original institution to assist them was the Cabinet. The Cabinet was also the first
of many presidential support structures that, under the pressure of
expanding federal government, outgrew their original objective to
supply “a few loyal and intelligent individuals who would offer coun214
sel when asked and would keep such consultations confidential.”
As the executive departments grew in magnitude and complexity over
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, it became obvious

211
212
213
214

PATTERSON, supra note 167, at 2.
STEPHEN HESS, ORGANIZING THE PRESIDENCY 5 (3d ed. 2002).
Hugh Heclo, The Changing Presidential Office, in THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY 23, 23–24
(James P. Pfiffner ed., 2d ed. 1999).
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT: AN HISTORICAL
OVERVIEW, at CRS-1 (2008), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-606.pdf [hereinafter
“THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT”].
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that Presidents needed something other than their Cabinet to collect
information, provide advice, and help them coordinate key areas and
215
In 1937, the President’s Committee on Administrative
programs.
Management—the group of prominent political science and public
administration experts known to administrative law scholars as the
216
Brownlow Commission—warned, “The President needs help.”
Assessing existing support as “entirely inadequate,” it recommended:
[The President should] be given a small number of executive assistants
who would be his direct aides in dealing with the managerial agencies
and administrative departments of the Government. These assistants,
probably not exceeding six in number, would be in addition to his present [Cabinet] secretaries, who deal with the public, with the Congress,
217
and with the press and the radio.

The result of this and other recommendations was FDR’s creation of
the Executive Office of the President (EOP), a new institution that
brought budget management into the White House and provided the
218
capacity for additional staff support for the President. At the time,
the EOP was seen as the solution to “effective coordination of the
219
tremendously wide-spread federal machinery.”
220
From its initial, fairly modest size, the EOP burgeoned rapidly.
Today, the entity created to allow the President to manage the federal bureaucracy is itself the size of a small agency. Currently com221
prising about 1800 people (down from a high of 2000 in 1980), the
EOP under President Obama consists of thirteen major offices,
222
boards, and councils, some of which have significant subunits. The
most relevant for present purposes is OMB, with about five hundred

215

216

217
218

219
220

221
222

Woodrow Wilson’s Council of National Defense is generally identified as the first serious
experiment in a special institution to assist the President in managing a policy domain.
See id. at CRS-1 to CRS-2.
THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., THE EXERCISE OF RULE-MAKING POWER AND
THE PREPARATION OF PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE MEASURES BY ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENTS
5 (1937) [hereinafter “Brownlow Commission”].
Id.
The EOP was created after passage of a statute authorizing the President to propose reorganization plans. After Congress approved his plan by joint resolution, Roosevelt issued
an executive order constituting the Executive Office.
THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 214, at CRS-8 (quoting the Brownlow committee).
Accounts of the evolution of the White House domestic policy staff include JOHN HART,
THE PRESIDENTIAL BRANCH: FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 26–129 (2d ed. 1995);
PATTERSON, supra note 167; SHIRLEY ANNE WARSHAW, THE DOMESTIC PRESIDENCY: POLICY
MAKING IN THE WHITE HOUSE 5–11 (1997).
See STANLEY & NIEMI, supra note 118, at 256–57.
See the list at WhiteHouse.gov, Executive Office of the President,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop.
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223

career and political appointees. About half of these people work in
the Resource Management Offices, currently five units defined by
224
subject area and staffed with program examiners who “develop and
225
support the President’s Budget and Management Agenda.”
The
remainder work in units that oversee procurement, financial man226
agement, and computing and information technology policy, that
develop the Administration position on pending bills and clear agen227
cies’ proposed legislation and congressional testimony, and that
228
conduct rulemaking review. The EOP’s budget for the 2010 fiscal
229
year is $439 million.
As the EOP grew in tandem with the job of managing the executive branch, Presidents needed a source of “immediate information
and advice on pressing national problems that could not be readily
230
obtained from the larger executive office.”
As a result, the White
House Office (WHO) emerged as the core of the current presidential
support structure. Typically headed by the President’s Chief of Staff,
the WHO is the part of the EOP most tailorable to the organizational
231
and decision-making preferences of each individual President. But
the WHO has not been immune from the pressures of increasing information management and analytical demands, and growing presidential ambitions. In the Obama Administration, it comprises two

223
224

225
226

227

228
229

230
231

See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 1109, (2009),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2010/assets/eop.pdf.
These are: Natural Resource Programs; Education, Income Maintenance and Labor Programs; Health Programs; General Government Programs; and National Security Programs. Office of Management & Budget, Executive Office of the President, Organization
Chart (2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/about_omb/omb_org_chart.pdf.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, THE MISSION AND STRUCTURE OF THE OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization_mission/.
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF E-GOVERNMENT & INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/e-gov/; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF
FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/financial_default/;
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF FEDERAL PROCUREMENT POLICY,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement_default/.
Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, supra note 189; Office of Management & Budget,
Office
of
Management
and
Budget’s
Legislative
Information
System,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/gils_lrd-gils/.
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFORMATION & REGULATORY AFFAIRS,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/regulatory_affairs/default/.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 200, at 409 tbl.27.1. The total budget for the
EOP is shown as $747 million, but $308 million of this is the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund.
RAGSDALE, supra note 10, at 321.
See id. at 343–45 (showing wide variation over time in number and function of units in
WHO).

Feb. 2010]

FALSE COMFORT AND IMPOSSIBLE PROMISES

407

dozen different substantive and administrative units employing al232
most five hundred people.
Thus, the trajectory of modern government has been mirrored
within the presidency: constantly pressed by the expanding scope
and complexity of the federal policy agenda and the entities charged
with pursuing it, Presidents develop new structures to compile and
analyze information, provide advice, and assert control. Those structures ramify, growing in size and specialization as the task of supervision grows. And Presidents come to need yet another institution, to
mediate between them and the structures developed to give them
help. The increasing appearance in recent administrations of
“czars”—individuals appointed by the President to facilitate policy
monitoring and development across traditional executive branch or233
ganizational units—may be the next iteration of this pattern.
The evolution of this large, multi-layered structure to assist the
President in understanding and controlling the government—which
234
some political scientists are now calling the “presidential branch” —
has two significant consequences for the present discussion.
First, the contrast drawn by unitary executive theorists between
the efficient, representationally direct singularity of presidential lea-

232

233

234

OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 223, at 1109; The White House, Executive Office
of the President, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop (last visited Jan 29,
2010).
Although the practice dates back at least as far as the Nixon Administration’s “energy
czar,” this has been a controversial point in the Obama Administration. The Senate recently held two hearings on the issue. See Examining the History and Legality of Executive
Branch “Czars” Before the S. Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on the Constitution, 111th Cong.
(2009), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=4098; Presidential Advice and Senate Consent: The Past, Present, and Future of Policy Czars Before the S. Comm.
on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009), available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=
5b22e173-5b74-46a0-b2ab-d300b6381de4.
A report published by the National Academy of Public Administration on the eve of
the Obama Administration urged creation of a new Office of Federal Management to
remedy perceived failures of OMB to “do[] an effective job of managing the executive
branch in the President’s interests.” Ironically, its title echoed the assessment of the
Brownlow Commission seventy years earlier. See Ronald C. Moe, The President Needs Help:
Proposed Office of Federal Management, 4 (Nat’l Acad. of Pub. Admin., Issue Paper, 2008),
available at http://www.napawash.org/pmc/papers/Moe_Proposed_Office_Federal_
Management_9_08_08.pdf.
E.g., MATTHEW J. DICKINSON, BITTER HARVEST: FDR, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE
GROWTH OF THE PRESIDENTIAL BRANCH (1997); HART, supra note 220; NELSON W. POLSBY,
THOUGHTS ON CONGRESS, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND THE RISE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
BRANCH (1988). Cf. Michael John Burton, The Contemporary Presidency: The “Flying White
House”: A Travel Establishment Within the Presidential Branch, 36 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 297
(2006) (arguing for a broader “functional” definition of the phrase to include more than
the EOP).
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dership on the one hand, and the chaotic, democratically deficient
collectivity of congressional action on the other, is over-simplified to
the point of inaccuracy. In important ways, modern presidential leadership is constituted through, and carried out by, a large and diverse
group of White House advisers and staff. This is not meant to imply
that anyone in this group disputes who is really “the boss.” Rather, it
is an effort to import into legal theorizing about the presidency a real
world dynamic long recognized by organizational theorists and other
social scientists: leaders need followers as much as followers need
235
leaders. The President is dependent upon his advisers and supporting staff because he must be; his dependency increases as the demands of the office and the scope of presidential ambition grow.
They identify the individuals, groups, and issues that merit his per236
sonal attention, determine the content and framing of the informa237
tion he receives, and communicate “the White House position” on
238
various policy matters to everyone else. None of these people, save
the Vice President, is elected; most of them are invisible to the pub239
lic.
235

236

237

238

239

See, e.g., KELLERMAN, supra note 44; Edwin P. Hollander, The Essential Interdependence of
Leadership and Followership, 1 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 71 (1992); Sumon Majumdar & Sharun W. Mukand, The Leader as Catalyst: On Leadership and the Mechanics of Institutional Change (CESifo., Working Paper No. 2337, 2008).
See, e.g., FRED I. GREENSTEIN, THE PRESIDENTIAL DIFFERENCE: LEADERSHIP STYLE FROM
FDR TO GEORGE W. BUSH 152–53 (2d ed. 2004) (describing the frustration of some of
Reagan’s principal advisers when staff structure changed to hierarchical model under
Chief of Staff Donald Regan, who rigorously controlled access to the President).
See, e.g., RICHARD M. PIOUS, WHY PRESIDENTS FAIL 92–107 (2008) (arguing that Carter’s
pollster Patrick Caddell was key in shaping his perception of the existence and nature of
a crisis in his presidency); Andrew Rudalevige, “The Decider”: Issue Management and the
Bush White House, in THE GEORGE W. BUSH LEGACY 135, 139 (Colin Campbell et al. eds.,
2008) (concluding that the “centralized politicization” of the George W. Bush Administration increased responsiveness to presidential policy preferences, but excluded analyses and alternatives that the President needed to calculate those preferences in an informed way).
For a vivid picture of how relations become strained between staff on the one hand and
members of the Cabinet and other high-level presidential appointees on the other, see
HESS, supra note 212, at 16–18. See also SHIRLEY ANNE WARSHAW, POWERSHARING: WHITE
HOUSE-CABINET RELATIONS IN THE MODERN PRESIDENCY (1996) (describing increasing
dominance of White House vis-à-vis Cabinet departments in policymaking since Nixon
presidency).
The intense controversy over Dick Cheney’s role during the George W. Bush Administration, see, e.g., BARTON GELLMAN, ANGLER: THE CHENEY VICE PRESIDENCY (2008); SHIRLEY
ANNE WARSHAW, THE CO-PRESIDENCY OF BUSH AND CHENEY (2009), underscores that
Americans are not prepared to accept that even an elected presidential adviser has significant power in Administration policymaking. The scope of Cheney’s influence was surely
atypical, but he is not the first modern Vice President to draw criticism for undue influence on policy. Dan Quayle’s role while chairing the Council on Competitiveness was a
frequent bone of contention during the George H.W. Bush Administration. See CHARLES

Feb. 2010]

FALSE COMFORT AND IMPOSSIBLE PROMISES

409

Second, overseeing this multi-layered support structure is itself a
formidable management imperative for the new President. A vast literature—authored by White House veterans, scholars of the presidency, and experts in public administration—is devoted to how the
White House establishment has been, and ought to be, selected, or240
Much of this literature recounts the failganized and supervised.
ures of previous chief executives: delegating too much to others, or
not enough; allowing the President’s closest aides too great a power
to filter whom he sees and what he hears, or attempting vainly to see
and hear everything himself; establishing advising and decision structures that stifle questioning and disagreement, or trying to craft policy and take action based on infighting and ambivalent dithering.
The advice on how to avoid these errors varies, but the basic lesson is
the same: for the modern President, the quest to direct the federal
government begins with the challenge of managing his own house.
The people on whom the President relies to help him control the
government are not all in the White House. In appointing Cabinet
Secretaries, agency heads, and various subordinate agency officials,
the President in theory extends his influence throughout the executive branch by placing “his” people in key positions of responsibility.
In actual practice, Presidents have mixed success using political appointments as instruments of organizational oversight and policy di241
rection.
The sheer size of federal government creates an impossi-

240

241

TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S STRATEGY FOR
GOVERNING WITHOUT CONGRESS 61–88 (1994); Robert J. Duffy, Divided Government and
Institutional Combat: The Case of the Quayle Council on Competitiveness, 28 POLITY 379 (1996).
In addition to works cited in previous notes, this literature includes: JOHN P. BURKE,
PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS: FROM POLITICS TO PRACTICE (2000); KOWERT, supra note
165; JAMES PFIFFNER, THE STRATEGIC PRESIDENCY: HITTING THE GROUND RUNNING (2d ed.
1996); THOMAS PRESTON, THE PRESIDENT AND HIS INNER CIRCLE: LEADERSHIP STYLE AND
THE ADVISORY PROCESS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2001); THE NERVE CENTER: LESSONS IN
GOVERNING FROM THE WHITE HOUSE CHIEFS OF STAFF (Terry Sullivan ed., 2004); Samuel
Kernell, The Evolution of the White House Staff, in THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note
213, at 37.
E.g., WARSHAW, supra note 220, at 117–44 (describing how, after departure of President
Reagan’s Assistant to the President for Policy Development Martin Anderson,
“[d]epartments began moving in their own directions, which often were at odds with the
administration’s broad goals” even though a key strategy had been selecting appointees
who shared Reagan’s conservative, deregulatory agenda); id. at 169–70 (describing specific instances during the George H.W. Bush presidency when appointed agency heads
publicly took policy positions at odds with those of White House); id at 185–210 (describing how lack of clear domestic policy goals coming into office and Clinton’s choice of an
ideologically diverse Cabinet hampered consistent, effective domestic policy control);
George A. Krause & Brent M. Dupay, Coordinated Action and the Limits of Presidential Control
over the Bureaucracy: Lessons from the Bush Presidency, in PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH’S
INFLUENCE OVER BUREAUCRACY AND POLICY 81 (Colin Provost & Paul Teske eds., 2009)
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ble management paradox. On the one hand, presidential appointees
represent only a very thin layer at the top of the major regulatory en242
tities. This has been a source of frustration for Presidents, and recent administrations have sought to extend the influence of political
243
appointees in the administrative policymaking process.
On the
other hand, the opportunity to select even a tiny fraction of the executive branch workforce translates into the President finding more
244
than 3300 people to be his voice out in the government. Stephen
Hess, staffer in Republican administrations and adviser to Republican
and Democratic Presidents, describes how political reality compromises the theory of extended presidential control through appointment:

242

243

244

(presenting case studies of the New Source Review Program and the National Security
Agency’s domestic surveillance program as instances when political appointees either delayed implementation of or thwarted entirely the President’s policy preferences).
For example, less than 0.5% of EPA’s nearly 18,000 employees are presidentially appointed; of employees at the manager level, the percentage is 2.91%. See DAVID E. LEWIS,
THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC
PERFORMANCE 82, 105 (2008) (giving data for other agencies as well).
This has not occurred through an overall increase in the number of political appointees,
see id. at 100 tbl.4.3, but rather through such strategies as heightened White House control over positions formally filled by agency heads, see note infra 244 (Schedule C appointments), shifting the proportion of political appointees among agencies depending
upon the degree to which the agency’s general policy orientation departs from the President’s agenda, see note 268 infra (describing patterns in Clinton, and both Bush, presidencies); and “management” steps such as the Bush Administration’s Executive Order
13,422 (2007), which required a presidentially-appointed regulatory policy officer to serve
as the gatekeeper for agency rulemaking. LEWIS, supra note 242, at 103; see also Amending
Executive Order 12866: Good Governance or Regulatory Usurpation? Part I and Part II: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://science.house.gov/Publications/
hearings_markups_details.aspx?NewsID=1777 (testimony of numerous regulatory law experts criticizing this for extending White House political control over regulation).
This figure is based on 2004 data and includes three components: (i) just under 1000
PAS (presidential appointment, senate confirmation) executive policymaking positions,
which include the very top of the management pyramid in agencies, plus US attorneys
and ambassadors; (ii) about 700 positions in the Senior Executive Service, the senior
management level that may, by statute, be up to 10% political appointees; and (iii) about
1600 Schedule C positions, which include special or confidential assistants to PAS appointees, directors of communications, and legislative liaisons. Although technically selected by the agency head, the White House has exercised significant control over Schedule C appointments since the Reagan administration. Gabriel Horton & David E. Lewis,
Turkey Farms, Patronage, and Obama Administration Appointments 5 (Ctr. for the Study of
Democratic
Inst.,
Working
Paper
No.
09-03,
2009),
available
at
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/
working%20papers/gabe%20and%20dave%20nov%2009.pdf (analyzing biographical data of more than 1000 people appointed in first 6 months of Obama Administration). The
figure given in the text is conservative. The total number may be as high as 9000 once
judgeships and advisory commission appointments are included. See id. at 5 n.7.
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A president-elect has political debts and obligations, but they are not
necessarily to those with the backgrounds he now needs. Thus he sometimes picks incompetents. Often he turns to strangers. With each appointment, he makes a contract to share his responsibilities. If it turns
out that the appointee and the president disagree, the appointee can
quit or the president can fire the appointee. Either action is a tacit admission of failure on the part of the nation’s leader. More commonly,
the president and the appointee split their differences and the president
245
loses some part of the direction of his administration.

In sum, although the President is a single individual, the modern
presidency is a large and complicated institution. It is constituted
from a mélange of people that includes substantive policy and technical experts, those with “insider” experience in Washington government, campaign and party loyalists, representatives of interest
groups whose support helped the President get elected and/or is
needed to advance his policy agenda, and nominees capable of sur246
viving the confirmation process. These people bring widely varying
skills and competency to their interaction with the career officials
and front-line staff who hold the substantive and institutional knowledge to make things happen (or not) within agencies. Using them to
accomplish the diffusion of presidential leadership through the executive branch poses considerable management challenges. More
importantly, it involves substantial agency costs that advocates of Pres247
ident-centered government ignore. No strategy of selection and direction allows the President to fill several thousand (or even several
hundred) vacancies with people who are his alter ego—that is, who
will unfailingly give him the information he would want to have (if he
knew it existed) and who will reliably convey to the people who do

245

HESS, supra note 212, at 13.

246

See RAGSDALE, supra note 10, at 321 (describing three strategies Presidents use in appointments: “Get the best people possible” (the bureaucratic strategy); “Get the people
you know best” (the intimacy strategy); and “Get people from the party and interest
groups” (the representation strategy)); Martha Joynt Kumar, The White House as City Hall:
A Tough Place to Organize, 31 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 44, 47, 49–50 (2001) (describing four
groups from which Presidents make appointments: Campaign people, who tend to
“think in a short time span, see the world in black and white, and have a sense of attack”;
personal presidential choices, “a handful of people to occupy positions [Presidents] consider to be crucial to the manner in which their presidenc[ies] function”; substantive policy people, “whose first thought is not the politics of it but the substance of it”; and people with White House experience, who know “how White Houses work and are
structured, [and] how decisions get made” (internal quotations omitted)).

247

Political scientist George Krause helpfully conceptualizes these costs as problems of “vertical coordination between presidents and their subordinates”; “horizontal coordination
among subordinates,” and “credible commitments arising from” relatively short tenure in
office. George A. Krause, Organizational Complexity and Coordination Dilemmas in U.S. Executive Politics, 39 PRESIDENTIAL. STUD. Q. 74, 75 (2009).
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the day-to-day work of government the message he would want them
to hear.
3. The Man Behind the Curtain
Trends have made more difficult for presidents that which was always
difficult but less aspired to—command of the instrumentalities of
government and control over policy.
—Bert A. Rockman, The Leadership Question: The Presidency and the American
248
System

[Presidents] seek singular control of information and policy decisions but
are forced to work through a collective apparatus. The pastiche of staffs,
interests, and loyalties make it difficult for presidents to gain either the
information or the control they seek. . . . The problem of control seems
inherently unsolvable.
249

—Lyn Ragsdale, Vital Statistics on the Presidency

Like the democracy claim, the “good government” claim of unitary executive theory lays a simplistic, reassuring veneer over a messy,
disquieting reality. Its wise, well-informed, and deliberative Managerin-Chief is ready and able to provide the hands-on leadership that can
infuse rational coordination, sensible prioritization, and publicregarding direction into the sprawling and conflicted federal policymaking enterprise. In fact, however, when the ambition of a unitary
executive President to control federal regulatory policy meets the
massive scope and complexity of modern regulatory government, the
results are very different from what unitary executive theory promises.
First, Presidents may aspire to comprehensive, coherent direction
of regulatory policy but White House control is in fact sporadic, at
times cacophonous, and often imperfectly realized. How could it be
otherwise? It is costly for Presidents and their advisers to monitor the
mass of agencies’ policymaking activities, to develop positions on the
often complex underlying substantive issues, to communicate those
positions to the people formally empowered to decide, and to actually get a decision implementing the President’s policy.
With respect to locating appropriate targets for presidential attention, the White House—like Congress—can use “fire alarm” signals
from interest groups, influential constituents, and the media to iden-

248
249

BERT A. ROCKMAN, THE LEADERSHIP QUESTION: THE PRESIDENCY AND THE AMERICAN
SYSTEM 168 (1984).
RAGSDALE, supra note 10, at 321–22 (emphasis omitted).
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tify targets of interest. But formal modeling and empirical work confirm what intuition suggests about this solution to the costs of information gathering and expertise gaps: it cannot produce consistent,
systematic oversight, and so introduces significant biases into the reg250
ulatory process.
Moreover, identifying the regulatory targets of
White House interest is only the beginning. The specific actions consistent with the President’s policy agenda must be determined, and
conveyed to the people in agencies with the authority to take them.
As the power of the presidency has become (in the words of presidential scholar Hugh Heclo) “more extended, scattered and
shared, . . . less of a prerogative, less unilateral, and less closely held
251
by the man himself,” the “President’s” position may in fact be constructed, and delivered, by multiple voices. Academic and insider accounts of White House operations describe an intensely absorbed,
highly energized atmosphere generated by staff units with distinct
252
expertise and perspectives.
At their best, they robustly debate the
multiple substantive and political implications of policy options; at
253
Even under the
their worst, they vie for advantage and influence.
most optimistic assumptions of universal, disinterested competence
and good judgment, the information flowing up to the President
about implications and options will be imperfect—and the message

250

E.g., Barry R. Weingast, Caught in the Middle: The President, Congress, and the PoliticalBureaucratic System, in THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 312, 329–30 (Joel D. Aberbach & Mark A.
Peterson eds., 2005) (use of fire-alarm oversight creates incentives for political appointees
to avoid actions that harm constituents of their Congressional or White House principals); see also Hugo Hopenhayn & Susanne Lohmann, Fire-Alarm Signals and the Political
Oversight of Regulatory Agencies, 12 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 196 (1996); cf. Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1994)
(describing how Reagan Administration initiation of centralized OMB review of rules revealed shortcomings of fire alarm oversight that led Congress to change its strategy).

251

Heclo, supra note 213, at 30.

252

E.g., RAGSDALE, supra note 10, at 316, 345 (offering empirical data about WHO under
various Presidents, and noting that during George W. Bush Administration, “the level of
specialization, especially in the WHO, is striking”); WARSHAW, supra note 220, at 14 (describing how the “White House staff has become a series of separate, and generally institutionalized, units with different responsibilities, different constituencies, and different
operating behavior”).

253

See HESS, supra note 212, at 5 (identifying one characteristic of the modern presidency as
“that presidential assistants have increasingly become special pleaders”); Robert Durant,
Back to the Future? Toward Revitalizing the Study of the Administrative Presidency, 39
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 89, 106 (2009) (arguing that over time “presidential appointees
tend to become just as stove-piped, jurisdictional, and imperialistic in their thinking and
actions” as the agencies whose policy the White House is trying to direct).
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flowing down to agency officials about “what the President wants
254
done” will at times be ambiguous, even contradictory.
And even when a clear policy position emerges, the White House
is not alone in trying to control the regulatory outcome. A significant
element of the unitary executive debate involves the true locus of au255
thority to exercise the power delegated in regulatory statutes.
Regardless of the formal allocation of power, however, presidential preferences must in fact compete with those of multiple congressional
committees with jurisdiction over the issue; interest groups who can
provide or withhold crucial political support to the President, as well
as mobilize media and grassroots opinion; state governors and other
local officials who feel the regional impacts of regulatory actions; and
sometimes even the divergent views of the agency leadership he ap256
pointed.
Even Presidents must pick their battles, and the White
254

255

256

See, e.g., GEORGE G. EDWARDS III & STEPHEN J. WAYNE, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP:
POLITICS AND POLICY MAKING 288–95 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing range of personal, political, and organizational factors that can impede transmission of clear, consistent policy directives from President to agencies); HESS, supra note 212, at 177–78 (discussing the serious potential for “distortion” as a major management problem: “Simple messages have
the best chance of surviving intact. But presidential messages are rarely simple, and in
the modern White House fewer and fewer aides hear directly from the president what he
really wants done”); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 66–69
(noting that, in interviews, EPA political appointees from George H.W. Bush and Clinton
Administrations described how multiple White House staff purported to speak for the
President, at times with contradictory direction).
The strongest unitary executive position (not endorsed by all unitarians) is that, regardless of the identity of the official to whom a statute purports to delegate regulatory authority, the only true recipient of the power can be the President. Inasmuch as he is
alone vested by Article II with the executive power, action by the statutory designee is at
his sufferance, and he may at any point determine to take the action himself. Compare,
e.g., Calabresi, supra note 3, at 82–85, with Pierce, supra note 6, at 520 (arguing that the
President has the power to fire decisionmakers who disobey a presidential directive, but
not to exercise the delegated authority himself).
Several empirical studies document how competition between presidential and congressional preferences in environmental regulation has produced fluctuating levels of EPA
activity. E.g., B. Dan Wood, Bureaucrats, Principals, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 213 (1988); B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 801, 818–21 (1991). For
evidence of the impact on attempted White House control from congressional and other
sources of regulatory policy competition, see, for example, Wood & Waterman, supra note
256, at 806–07 (finding that early Reagan Administration success in cutting back on antidiscrimination enforcement by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission diminished
after controversial General Counsel Michael Connelly resigned and was replaced by a
“career-oriented” appointee who was “more palatable to the Congress and EEOC constituencies”); id. at 811–12 (finding competing congressional and presidential influence
on number of safety violations cited by Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspectors); id. at
815–16 (finding decline in number of National Highway Transportation Safety Administration engineering evaluations, despite strong Administration interest in auto safety,
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House will sometimes be forced strategically to refrain from policy direction. Capturing these complexities of policy leadership in contemporary U.S. government, White House veteran Stephen Hess describes how Presidents come to discover that:
the experience of being president was different from what [they]
thought it would be or from what [they] learned in [their] civics textbooks. Four years or eight years seemed like a very long time from the
outside, a very short time when [they were] in office. It is never long
enough to do any real planning—to think about where the country
ought to be, even in the next decade, and to design programs to get from
here to there. [Their] time was consumed by crises and the demands of
others, bargaining with legislators, waging feuds, performing small symbolic acts, worrying about getting reelected, finding people for jobs and
getting rid of them (often by kicking them upstairs), approving budgets
that [they] could only change around the edges. [They] never really
257
“ran” the government, as [they] had expected.

The second significant dimension on which the reality of presidential oversight differs from the unitary executive story is politics.
Presidents since Ronald Reagan have unabashedly admitted that their
“management agenda” involves not only coordination, rationalization, and conflict resolution, but also aligning regulatory outputs with
258
“the President’s priorities.”
So long as the story features a Representative-in-Chief who truly and distinctively embodies the voters’
mandate, the wishes of the national majoritarian coalition, or the interests of the whole nation, this expansive view of what counts as
“management” can claim to be a virtue. Conflating management
with the imposition of a particular set of policy preferences becomes
far more problematic, however, once the President’s delphic claim to

257
258

during tenure of appointee whose regulatory philosophy was unexpectedly at odds with
Administration’s); id. at 817–18 (finding impact on Reagan Administration pattern of deregulating surface mining after state government pushback); see also Durant, supra note
253, at 97–105 (case studies of Clinton Administration effort to increase military environmental compliance). For a broadbased model of the ways in which Presidents can unilaterally effect policy control, and the circumstances in which congressional and judicial
action is likely to limit unilateral presidential policy direction, see WILLIAM G. HOWELL,
POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION (2003).
HESS, supra note 212, at 20.
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, § 4 (Sept. 30, 1993). See also OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 225 (OMB’s Resource Management offices exist to “develop
and support the President’s Budget and Management Agenda,” which involves “provid[ing] ongoing policy and management guidance to federal agencies”). Since the formalization of centralized White House rulemaking review in the early months of the Reagan Administration, see Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981), the
proportion of rules as to which OMB required a change before designating “consistent”
with White House criteria has risen from 5% (1981) to 72% (2007). RAGSDALE, supra
note 10, at 317, 348–51.
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channel the will of the people is called into question—and it is deeply
disturbing when the account is fleshed out to include the central role
of White House staff and other political appointees, who have no
even colorable claim to oracular representational status.
A less simplistic and romanticized understanding of presidential
politics would predict that presidential policy direction will reflect the
jumbled mix we see elsewhere in the democratic political environment: disinterested conception of the public good; constituency service; rational strategy for consolidating and extending political influence; narrowly self-interested (if not actually unethical) behavior; and
ordinary, garden variety ambivalence and equivocation. This is indeed what anecdotal and (limited) empirical evidence reveals. White
House direction of regulatory policy sometimes takes the politicallytough high road of far-sighted wisdom; the rest of the time, it attends
259
to some regulatory players more than others, responds to the wishes
of groups that have been important to the President’s political suc260
261
cess, favors electorally significant interests and areas, and furthers
262
the personal interests of close presidential advisers. This does not
make presidential policy preferences more suspect than those of other
major actors in the regulatory arena, but it should warn us against giving the President monopoly power over regulatory policy under the
guise of “good government” management, rather than forcing the

259

260

261
262

See, e.g., Virginia Sapiro & David T. Canon, Race, Gender, and the Clinton Presidency, in THE
CLINTON LEGACY 169, 170 (Colin Campbell & Bert A. Rockman eds., 2000) (discussing
how Bill Clinton “focused substantial attention on the distinctive needs” of African Americans, Hispanics and feminist women’s groups through appointments, policies and “symbolic politics,” and received in return support at crucial moments in his presidency); Duffy, supra note 239, at 387–95 (discussing examples that fueled criticism of George H. W.
Bush Administration Council on Competitiveness for “granting privileged access to industry groups, allowing them to push for [regulatory] concessions they were unable to attain
from Congress or the EPA” while keeping public interest groups “at arms-length”).
Mark A. Peterson, Still a Government of Chums: Bush, Business, and Organized Interests, in
THE GEORGE W. BUSH LEGACY 288, 313–15 (Colin Campbell et al. eds., 2008) (discussing
a range of policy contexts and concluding that business and conservative interest groups
and organizations “financed [George W. Bush’s] campaigns, provided a significant proportion of the personnel for his administration, granted the coherent coalitional resources to gain leverage over legislation and policymaking in support of their shared
agendas, and were richly rewarded with policy outcomes not to be widely shared with anyone else”); cf. Mark A. Peterson, Clinton and Organized Interests: Splitting Friends, Unifying
Enemies, in THE CLINTON LEGACY 140 (Colin Campbell & Bert A. Rockman eds., 2000)
(discussing contradictions and failures of Clinton’s interest group strategies with respect
to traditional Democratic supporters such as organized labor).
See supra notes 155–60 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., WARSHAW, supra note 239, at 132–58 (reviewing energy, environmental, and procurement contexts in which Vice President Cheney controlled policy outcomes to the
benefit of former clients, associates, and future employer).
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White House to compete in the democratic marketplace with all the
other voices contending to define what regulatory policy best serves
the people’s interests.
The third significant area in which the reality of presidential
“management” differs from unitary executive promises involves the
cost to certain values that have been central to the growth of the regulatory state. One of these values is expertise. We no longer believe—if we ever did—that achieving good regulatory policy requires
only assembling the right team of experts. But even before the sci263
ence controversies of the George W. Bush Administration, informed observers of the regulatory process had become concerned
that aggressive presidential directory efforts induce the opposite sort
264
of error: treating regulation as if it were all (or mostly) politics. A
philosophy of governing rooted in claims about the representational
supremacy and superior managerial rationality of presidential control
will predictably devalue the role of knowledge (and knowledge265
holders) lying outside the President’s purview. Even if the democracy and managerial claims of unitary executive theory were wellfounded, a predilection for subordinating subject-area experience
and scientific opinion to political judgment is a more serious threat
to sound regulatory policy than overstating the value of expertise.
Experts cannot give us the right answers when fundamental value
choices must be made, but they can define the range of sensible regulatory options, bring to bear practical wisdom informed by experience, and prevent us from making costly cognitive errors of percep266
tion and judgment.
Concerns that the unitary executive approach to management actually threatens sound regulatory decision making have been validated by David Lewis’s recent analysis of bureaucratic performance
during the George W. Bush administration, the presidency that built
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265

266

See, e.g., Michele Estrin Gilman, The President as Scientist-in-Chief, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
565 (2009); W. Henry Lambright, Government and Science: A Troubled, Critical Relationship
and What Can Be Done About It, 68 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 5 (2008); Donald P. Moynihan &
Alasdair S. Roberts, The End of an Idea? The Bush Administration and the Exhaustion of the Politicized Presidency (La Follette School Working Paper No. 2008-024), available at
http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/publications/workingpapers/moynihan2008-024.pdf.
See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 250; Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745 (1996).
It does not seem coincidental that Ronald Reagan, in whose presidency unitary executive
theory was born, was also known for the vehemence of his public derision of “the bureaucracy”—i.e., career federal executive employees.
See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 164, at 575–77, 579–82, 601–03 (exploring the
strengths and weaknesses of lay and expert decision making, and the resulting dangers of
excessive political control over regulatory outcomes).
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on and extended twenty years of determined politicization of admin267
On the Program Assessment Rating Tool
istrative agencies.
(PART)—the numerical measure devised by the Administration and
administered by OMB to grade program performance—programs
headed by political appointees got systematically lower grades than
those led by career managers; higher percentages of appointees on the
268
management team also produced lower PART scores.
Analyzing
demographic characteristics of careerists and appointees that might
plausibly relate to management performance, Professor Lewis found
that previous experience in the program and longer tenure in management positions were the systematic differences that had explana269
tory value.
Programs managed by political appointees also fared badly in another Bush Administration measure of performance—the Federal
Human Capital Survey, designed to measure “employees’ perceptions
of whether, and to what extent, conditions characterizing successful

267

The study used government-wide data from government sources: the “Plum Book” (the
list of presidentially appointed positions, officially titled United States Government Policy
and Supporting Positions, available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/plumbook/), the Central Personnel Data File of the Office of Personnel Management, the Program Assessment
Rating Tool, and the Federal Human Capital Survey. See LEWIS, supra note 242, at 103,
189.

268

LEWIS, supra note 242, at 172–84. Analyzing how Presidents shifted the incidence of political appointees across agencies, Professor Lewis found that Presidents George H.W.
Bush and George W. Bush targeted agencies with a “liberal” policy orientation for additional appointments, while President Clinton targeted those with a “conservative” orientation. Id. at 127–28 (finding, inter alia, that “[t]he advent of a Republican administration
is estimated to increase the number of [Senate-confirmed] appointees by 50 positions in
liberal or moderate agencies compared to only 10 in conservative agencies”). These results were robust even after controlling for differences among programs (e.g., type,
budget), variations in management environment (size, executive or independent, internal organization), and policy content (liberal/conservative tilt, creation during divided
government). Id. at 180–84.
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Id. at 188–89. Professor Lewis observes that political appointees lack “site-specific knowledge[,] . . . . expertise in specific policy areas, familiarly with key stakeholders, an understanding of the folkways and informal power relationship of the agency and its policy
arena, and aspects of federal work as mundane as how the accounting, records, and personnel systems work.” Id. at 144. Even demographic characteristics that would seem to
favor appointee managers in terms of program performance–higher levels of education,
private management experience, and previous work in the White House or Congress–
could not compensate. Id. at 185. The average tenure of top appointees (PAS) was only
twenty-four months; that of lower level appointees was even shorter. Id. at 145. Professor
Lewis points out that shorter management tenure has implications throughout the program: “Increased turnover creates leadership vacuums, sends mixed signals about agency
goals, and diminishes an agency’s commitment to reform, resulting in generally poorer
performance.” Id. at 145. It also “disrupts working relationships among functionally related agencies and programs.” Id.
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organizations are present in their agencies.”
Those programs got
systematically lower employee ratings on leadership, management
271
and work climate than programs run by careerists. As the percentage of appointees on the management team increased, employees
were less likely to respond that their agency’s management “generate[s] high levels of motivation and commitment in the workforce,”
“review[s] and evaluate[s] the organization’s progress toward meeting its goals,” and “promote[s] communication among different work
272
units.”
The second core value at risk from the unitary executive management claim is most immediately conceptualized as legality—but
might ultimately be understood as democracy itself. Peter Strauss has
powerfully described how White House direction can disrupt the intricate network of statutory and judicially-imposed duties and con273
straints within which agencies must act.
To be sure, legality is no
more the sole guarantor of sound regulatory policy than expertise.
But presidential judgment cannot supply all that is lost when politics
supersedes administrative law. Our perennial focus on making regulatory processes faster, cheaper, and smarter tends to obscure one of
the existing, most fundamental strengths of those processes: judged
by the current top two metrics of democratic government—
“transparency” and “participation”—administrative policymaking is
clearly superior to any other type of federal government decision
making. By law, most important regulatory actions must be publicly
announced. Agencies do not have the presidential prerogative of
274
making law by secret directive and unannounced modification. By
270

271
272
273
274

U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., ENSURING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS AN
EFFECTIVE
CIVILIAN
WORKFORCE,
FEDERAL
HUMAN
CAPITAL
SURVEY,
http://www.fhcs.opm.gov/. The Survey was administered every other year by the Office
of Personnel Management, an independent agency that manages the civil service. Professor Lewis analyzed 2002 and 2004 data.
See LEWIS, supra note 242, at 189–94.
Id. at 195. The quoted language comes from the Survey questions.
See Strauss, supra note 12; Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
965 (1997).
Although executive orders are now routinely published in the Federal Register, a significant number of presidential directives are not publicly available. See the lists maintained
by the Federation of American Scientists. FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, PRESIDENTIAL
DIRECTIVES AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/direct.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2010). The George W. Bush Administration OLC advised that no public notice was required when the President determined to modify or depart from a published
executive order. While this advice seems consistent with existing law, commenters were
quick to point out its implications with respect to, for example, Executive Order Number
12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981), which limits executive branch electronic surveillance of Americans traveling abroad, who are not covered by existing statutory protec-
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law, any individual (even those disenfranchised from voting) can
comment on a proposed rulemaking and is entitled to have his or her
comment considered by the agency. Those who get to address congressional or White House policy makers do only as a matter of grace,
and no one suggests such privileges are universally available or equitably distributed. Even in administrative adjudication, opportunities
for participation are broader than in the federal courts, who hear only those with certain, legally cognizable types of injuries and interests.
By law, most important regulatory decisions must be publicly justified,
with reference to a contemporaneous factual record and reasons that
are sensible and within the agency’s statutory charge. The obligation
275
to explain their exercise of public power is minimal on Congress
276
and effectively nonexistent on the President. By law, agencies must
open their deliberative meetings to any member of the public, and
respond to requests for information about their activities from any
individual or group. Congress, the President, and the courts are categorically exempt from the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and
277
the Government in the Sunshine Act.
To be sure, the reality of public engagement in regulatory decision
making is nowhere near the level of legally-supported transparency
and participation. However, not even the potential of broad-based citizen understanding and involvement exists if the processes of administrative law are short-circuited or overridden by White House direc278
tion.
Here as well, unitary executive theory turns out to
undermine, rather than advance, a constitutive ideal of the regulatory
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277
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tions. See Secret Law and the Threat to Democratic and Accountable Government: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution, S. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. (April 20, 2008), available
at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=3305; Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and
Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489 (2007).
Unless the statute implicates a suspect class or fundamental right, or attempts to abrogate
the states’ sovereign immunity, Congress gets the benefit of judicial willingness to hypothesize “any state of facts [that] reasonably may be conceived to justify” its policy judgment. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
See Kevin M. Stack, The Reviewability of the President’s Statutory Powers, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1171,
1210–11 (2009) (discussing the “background presumption” of presidential exceptionalism and arguing that longstanding doctrines that exclude judicial review of presidential
findings and determinations should be replaced).
5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 552b (2006). The exemptions of Congress and the judiciary are explicit.
See id. §§ 551; 552(f). The exemption of the President is implicit. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992). The Executive Office of the President is expressly included in these transparency statutes, but increasingly expansive claims of executive privilege temper the practical effect of the statutory inclusion. See infra notes 278–79 and
accompanying text.
For a proposal to change this legal regime with respect to transparency at least, see Nina
A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010).
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state. Invoking the principle of executive privilege, the George W.
Bush Administration routinely refused congressional requests for information relevant to agency and program oversight, substantially increased the number of classified documents as secret and the range
of executive officials with authority to impose this classification, substantially increased the number of FOIA denials on grounds other
than the national security exemption, and asserted power to prevent
the release of a previous administration’s records even if the former
279
President disagrees.
This assertion of presidential prerogative to
control access to information is so extreme, in degree and comprehensiveness, that even those generally sympathetic to executive privilege conclude that the doctrine has been stretched almost beyond
280
recognition.
Yet, as the Conclusion develops further, the progression toward extremism is not surprising given the nature of unitary
executive ideology.

CONCLUSION
Leaders and followers share responsibility for leadership, bad as well as
good. . . . None of us is off the hook.
—Barbara Kellerman, Bad Leadership

281

The movement toward President-centered government is one of
the most significant trends in modern American history. During
most of this time, the shift has been incremental, de facto, and situational. The President was the natural beneficiary of leadership
needs and opportunities created by the domestic growth of a massive
federal regulatory enterprise and the international emergence of
world-wide warfare and global geopolitics. This pragmatic evolution
towards a balance of power decidedly in favor of the executive was
immeasurably aided by communication technologies that allowed the
President to reach out personally to the people, explaining and exhorting, framing events and seeking alliance.
These political and cultural developments maintained an uneasy
relationship with the Constitution. When put to legal test, vigorous
279
280

281

See PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 121–32 (2009).
See, e.g., Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege Revived?: Secrecy and Conflict During the Bush Presidency, 52 DUKE L.J. 403 (2002) (assessment, by a scholarly defender of executive privilege, that the Bush Administration has weakened the principle of executive privilege by
overreaching and departing from “recognized” executive privilege norms).
See KELLERMAN, supra note 44, at 226.
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assertions of presidential power did not map well onto existing un282
Then came the 1980s.
derstandings of constitutional authority.
Unitary executive theory appeared, to make an unapologetic, even
aggressive, case for President-centered government. Presidential control over domestic policy and international affairs was elegantly and
passionately shown to be not only the type of government Americans
need in an increasingly dangerous world, but also the intended constitutional order of things.
Presidential behavior has not been the same since. Armed with
unitary executive theory, Presidents of both parties (even those careful not to rely on its originalist constitutional reasoning) have gone
on the offensive. They and their advisers have claimed directory authority over the people and the decisions involved in regulatory policymaking. They have asserted the prerogative to collect, hold close,
and act unilaterally upon the information needed to preserve the security of the nation and the safety of its citizens. They have become
hypervigilant to discover, and quick to protest against, perceived incursions on their power by Congress, the courts and even private parties. Unitary executive theory has given Presidents a new sense of entitlement to get their way in leading the nation.
As for the rest of us, unitary executive theory tells us a story we
want to hear. The democracy claim promises a representative uniquely fitted by constitutional design to extract from the Babel of
modern democratic politics the essence of what we truly desire, and
the nation truly needs. The managerial claim promises that the President, if he can deploy all the powers the Constitution means him to
have, will direct the process of national policymaking to fulfill these
needs and desires. The rapidly changing complexity, and the newly
appreciated precariousness, of modern American life make the simplicity, certainty, and assurance of this story deeply appealing. At the
same time, the extraordinary demands of governing a large, heterogeneous nation with an ambitious regulatory agenda and globally defined interests make unitary executive theory’s promises impossible
for any President to fulfill.
My aim is not to suggest that some other government actor is better suited to play the part of Representative and Manager-in-Chief, or
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See, e.g., United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (rejecting authority of
Executive officials to order warrantless domestic wiretapping for reasons of national security); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (rejecting executive authority
to enlist judicial process in forcing newspaper to suspend publication of classified information); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (rejecting presidential authority to seize private property in the absence of statutory authority).
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to deny that the President has a unique, extensive, and central role to
play in modern American government. Rather, as I and others have
283
argued elsewhere, the essential point is that no one institution of
government is authorized, or able, to speak for the people and to
manage singlehandedly the enterprise of contemporary regulatory
government. We must expect and challenge all the institutions of
government—–Congress, the President, the courts, and agencies
themselves—–to be part of an ongoing process through which democratic legitimacy is created and effective policy discovered, a process that must seek new and more effective ways to inform and engage
citizens. A fundamental danger of unitary executive theory is that we
will be lulled into thinking that this unwieldy, constant, and demanding work need not be done, so long as we select the “right” person to
be President.
The other fundamental danger is that we will attribute excesses
done in the name of unitary executive theory to the idiosyncratic failings of individuals, rather than recognizing them as intrinsic, largely
uncontrollable risks of the theory itself. What we saw from unitary
executive leadership during the period of severe societal stress following September 11 aligns disturbingly well with a pattern familiar to
284
psychologists who study extremist groups and ideologies. Questions
about the leader’s choices are constructed as attacks; disagreement is
285
cast as disloyalty.
The group’s authority structure becomes more
286
No incipient challenge to the belief strucsuspicious and closed.
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See Farina, supra note 7; Shane, Political Accountability, supra note 77; Peter L. Strauss, The
Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 573, 578 (1984).
For discussion of the literature, see Hogg & van Knippenberg, Social Identity, supra note
44, at 38; Hogg, Prototypicality, supra note 44, at 21–22; Michael A. Hogg, Uncertainty, Social
Identity, and Ideology, 18 ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES 203, 211–19 (Shane R. Thye et al.
eds., 2005); Christiane Schoel et al., Self-Uncertainty and the Appeal to Authoritarian
Leadership, 3–5, 17 (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.allacademic.com
//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/4/5/7/9/pages245790/p245790-1.php).
The perception of an administration stifling and punishing criticism could be found at
both ends of the political spectrum. See e.g., James Bovard, “Free-Speech Zone”: The Administration Quarantines Dissent, AM. CONSERVATIVE, Dec. 15, 2003, available at
http://www.amconmag.com/article/2003/dec/15/00012/; Robert Fisk, War Lords to
Their Critics: “Just Shut Up”: Bush’s War and the Lapdog Press Corps, COUNTERPUNCH, Apr.
10, 2004, available at http://www.counterpunch.org/fisk04102004.html. See also Michael
P. Allen, George W. Bush and the Nature of Executive Authority: The Role of Courts in a Time of
Constitutional Change, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 871, 903 (2007) (describing intolerance to criticism and retribution against critics as attributes of a “commitment to [the] unilateral
[exercise of] power”).
See, e.g., CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE
SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 85–118, 160–76 (2007); Allen, supra note 285
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ture is allowed to go uncontested.
Any power the leader needs to
meet the danger becomes his by right, for no ordinary rules can interfere with the duty—which is his alone and outweighs all his other
288
responsibilities—to preserve the group. It turns out that the qualities of a group or belief system most effective at reducing the cognitive and psychological stress of uncertainty are also the seeds of fanaticism. Many of those sympathetic to unitary executive theory have
been dismayed by its operationalization in the Bush Administration.
They insist that President Bush and his advisers radicalized, even dis289
torted, the theory.
But the unitary executive presidency of that
Administration is recognizably the presidency of the literature that
argues the constitutional and normative case for unitary executive
theory. The demands (and opportunities) of national crisis merely
accelerated the trajectory of its development.
Unitary executive theory is politically and culturally powerful because of its uncomplicated, unconditional certitude. In the words of
two prominent proponents, “The Constitution grants the President
the authority to superintend the administration of federal law. There
290
are no caveats. There are no exceptions.”
Because of these same
qualities, it is a philosophy for governing that contains no meaningful
limits. Particularly in the rapidly changing complexity, and newly appreciated precariousness, of modern American life, this is comfort
purchased at too dear a price.
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(both describing Bush administration tendency to act in secret and otherwise control information).
Consider more than a thousand constitutional objections in signing statements, which
ranged from attacking the legitimacy of core substantive provisions of the law being
signed, to protesting such seemingly mundane provisions as defining the substantive expertise required for agency officials. See Peter M. Shane, Presidential Signing Statements and
the Rule of Law as an “Unstructured Institution”, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 231 (2007).
Consider the reasoning advising the President that, in waging the war on terror, he was
not bound by international agreements like the Geneva Convention, or domestic law like
the statutory prohibition of torture. See, e.g., Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, to Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs, Applicability of 18 U.S.C. §4001(a) to Military Detention of United States
Citizens
(June
27,
2002),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/
memodetentionuscitizens06272002.pdf; Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, supra note 6.
See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, From a Unitary to a Unilateral Presidency, 88 B.U. L. REV. 523
(2008); Richard Pierce, Saving the Unitary Executive Theory from Those Who Would Distort and
Abuse It: A Review of The Unitary Executive by Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo, 12
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 593 (2010).
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at 664.

